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Abstract
This thesis probes for patterns in the escalation of Russian interventions against neighboring
post-Soviet states after the Cold War. It then seeks to explain the causation of such patterns. I
conclude that the factors influencing the intensity levels of Russian interventions can be understood
within a periodized framework. After the USSR’s collapse, Russia’s limited economic capacity
prevented it from intensifying its interventions against neighboring ex-Soviet states. An increase in
economic power at the turn of the century then shifted Russia’s intervention calculus. Russia is most
likely to escalate to a significant intensity level when its economy is strong and the targeted state is
not a NATO member but is progressing toward membership. The likelihood of Russian intervention
increases if these factors remain true and Russia can act with plausible deniability — especially at a
time when the U.S. is unlikely to interfere militarily with Russia’s plans. Yet, even in times of
economic strength, Russia will cap its interventions against NATO member states below the level of
armed conflict.
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Chapter 1: The Question
Introduction
If, on an occasional sunny day in the Estonian city of Narva, one were to walk along the
city’s eponymous river from south to north, one would encounter a charming sight. The quaint
medieval Hermann Castle complex, its white tower peering over the outer walls, clings to the
western riverbank. Hugging the eastern bank across the narrow river, the impressive Ivangorod
Fortress, dwarfing the Hermann Castle, faces its smaller neighbor. Together, these timeworn sentries
bookend the Estonia-Russia border as it runs in the middle of the Narva River.
Despite the pleasant picture formed by these castles, their history is chilly — and some fear
they may provide the backdrop to a violent future. Dating to the early fourteenth century, the
Hermann Castle originated as the local Danish inhabitants’ easternmost outpost to protect the
population during conflicts with Russians living across the river. The castle’s second inhabitants,
members of a Germanic Teutonic Knights offshoot, bolstered its defenses the following century
after the Moscovian Grand Prince Ivan III built the imposing Ivangorod fortress on the opposite
side of the river crossing.1 Some scholars and policymakers now worry that, centuries later, Narva
must once again prepare for Russian aggression from across the river. Following the 2014 Russian
annexation of the Ukrainian Crimean peninsula, eyes around the world turned to Narva, wondering
if the tranquil Estonian border city might soon follow.2 The connection is logical; the two regions
share striking similarities in their substantial ethnic Russian populations, histories of secessionist
referendums and exposed geographic positions bordering Russian territory. The likelihood of such

“Hermann Castle, Narva, Estonia.” SpottingHistory. Accessed March 30, 2020.
Trimbach, David J., and Shannon O’Lear. “Russians in Estonia: Is Narva the next Crimea?”
Eurasian Geography and Economics 56, no. 5 (2015): 493.
1
2
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an annexation is, however, highly debatable. This would represent not only a violation of Estonian
sovereignty but also an unprecedented and provocative incursion into the borders of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Russia has already once crippled Estonia with attacks in the
cyber domain, and further escalation remains possible.
Narva’s predicament is not unique in the region. As the Soviet Union disintegrated as a
political entity in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the former superpower’s territory fractured into
fifteen independent states, many of which contained autonomous territories within their borders.
For the last three decades, the Russian Federation — the USSR’s legal successor and by far the
largest, wealthiest and most politically powerful of these states — has developed complicated
relations with the other independent states that emerged and reemerged along its border. Within the
last fifteen years, as Russia has recovered from significant economic decline and increased its
capacity for projecting power across the region, it has engaged in conflicts with several of its weaker
neighbors. Many Western scholars, policymakers and even casual observers have labeled this
behavior as Russian revisionism, often implying that Russia’s leaders and citizens seek to restore
Russia to the Soviet Union’s regional and prominent global position. While this thesis does not
evaluate the validity of this claim, it does investigate the stimuli that appear to trigger these Russian
escalations. Situations such as that of Narva beg the question: what factors lead Russia to escalate
the intensity of its interventions against neighboring post-Soviet states?
Through this examination, this paper aims to create a portrait of the conditions that increase
the intensity levels of Russian interventions. An understanding of the factors that impact this
Russian calculus can inform policymakers and scholars of the causes of aggressive Russian behavior,
as opposed to a general diagnosis of nostalgia for the eminence of the USSR. As countries along the
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Russian border fear their massive neighbor could soon attempt to raise the Russian flag above their
cities, back disruptive separatist movements within their borders or cripple their economies through
the internet, analysis of the trends behind Russian escalation against its neighbors becomes even
more urgent. This paper examines issues and patterns that could impact the behavior of leaders and
states for decades to come.
After an extended study of Russian intervention in the cases of Ukraine, Georgia and
Estonia, I conclude that the factors influencing escalation of Russian interventions can be best
understood within a periodized framework of two distinct eras. After the USSR’s collapse, Russia’s
limited economic capacity prevented it from escalating the intensity levels of its interventions against
neighboring post-Soviet states for an extended period of time. Even at points at which Russian
escalation was plausible, such as aggressive diplomacy during the 1993 Crimean crisis and severe
tensions in 1993 over troop movements and the treatment of Russian minorities in Estonia, Russia
was simply too weak to intervene at higher intensity levels.
By 2007, however, Russia’s economy had largely recovered from this lengthy period of
economic vulnerability, which in turn enabled more assertive behavior. Higher level intervention in
the region was back on the table, and Russia’s heightened capacity led to increasingly aggressive
interventions in response to specific triggers. Yet, even this newly bellicose Russia still displayed an
unwillingness to cross the threshold of direct military intervention against NATO states in its
neighborhood. Instead, as demonstrated by the 2007 Russian cyberattacks against NATO member
Estonia, increased aggression against NATO remained restricted to strictly non-kinetic domains.
Non-NATO states in the region, however, experienced interventions reaching the threshold of
armed conflict. When these states began to achieve substantial progress in the process leading to
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NATO membership, Russia launched military interventions to block those states’ accessions into
NATO, as in Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014. Since these attacks, Russia has remained
entrenched in its ongoing conflict in eastern Ukraine, but it has not pursued further major
interventions in the region. Its signals to NATO about eastward expansion appear to have dissuaded
the Western alliance from further courting former Soviet states.

Chapter 2: The Theory
Case Selection
The paper tests this argument by examining variation of intervention intensity levels within
and across three case studies: Russian intervention in Ukraine, Georgia and Estonia. These three
case studies were selected because they constitute the universe of cases of high-intensity Russian
intervention against states in its near abroad after the fall of the USSR.3 Although Russia’s
relationships with its other neighbors are certainly intriguing and worthy of examination, this paper
does not include neighboring states that were not Soviet republics. The research question is limited
to states formerly incorporated into Soviet territory because of the unique relationship created by
their lengthy and only recently dissolved union. For this reason, former members of the Soviet
Union’s Warsaw Pact military alliance, like Poland and Hungary, are not included in the study. Due to
this focus on the former Soviet space, cases like recent Russian intervention in Syria and Russian
nonintervention in the former Yugoslavia during the 1990s are not examined. Additionally, the
research question only examines Russian interventions against states and not against non-state

The term “near abroad” is used in scholarly discourse with diverse implications, often referring to
states that Russia considers within its sphere of influence. For the sake of brevity throughout this
paper, I use the term “near abroad states,” abbreviated as “NA states,” to refer specifically and solely
to the subset of states that were formerly republics in the Soviet Union, excluding Russia.
3
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actors. Conflicts like the Chechen Wars or the War of Dagestan are therefore not considered in this
paper, although the level of Russian intervention was significant in both cases.
Lastly, the cases examined are limited to those in which Russia has experienced its most
serious disputes. Although discussions of Russia’s security posture toward all of its former Soviet
republic neighbors is an important topic of discussion, this paper focuses on how Russia scales the
intensity of its interventions when disputes arise with these NA states. The cases of Russian relations
with Ukraine, Georgia and Estonia involve the most serious disputes with NA states. Furthermore,
these cases represent the only cases of NA state disputes in which Russia has escalated interventions
to significant intensities, with reasonable evidence indicating Russian state support. The three
selected case studies therefore represent the full range of cases relevant to the research question.
Each of the cases represents an appropriate point of examination under the parameters
described above. This paper analyzes why, in all three instances, Russia intervened at different levels
during different crises. Comparative analysis of the patterns within each case study against those of
the other two then provides a robust framework for testing the hypotheses.

Intervention Intensity Scale
This paper conceptualizes the use of force as part of a continuum of intensity levels in the
following figure. This represents the scale of possible actions Russia could take when intervening
against NA states, ordered from least assertive to most assertive. This continuum reflects that the
actions at the highest intensity levels are generally the most likely to be deterred, as states will only
select into such conflicts when no less costly solution agreeable to both parties exists. Low-intensity
and low-visibility actions like espionage at the conventional and cyber levels are exceedingly difficult
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for states to prevent and are therefore placed at the lower end of both axes. Cyberattacks represent a
significant increase in intensity, due to their potential to cripple a country’s civil networks, military
communications and economic infrastructure. The threshold of violence intersects cyberattacks on
the continuum, as cyberattacks possess the potential to directly cause physical damage. The next
steps of intervention in the continuum, all in the kinetic domain, progress in intensity due to the
substantial increases in both the stakes at hand and the countries’ kinetic engagements at each step.

Theoretical Reasoning
This paper’s conclusions about the factors influencing Russian escalation follow the
predictions of four hypotheses and one sub-hypothesis, which are each grounded in security studies
literature. After evaluating these hypotheses within each case study and across the cases collectively, I
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synthesize the findings for the hypotheses into one theory, which articulates how the interaction of
different factors causes variation in the intensity level of Russian intervention against NA states.
H1 asserts that Russia is less likely to directly intervene at the level of military action against
NA states with NATO membership. Its sub-hypothesis, H1A, claims that U.S. credibility at a given
point affects the intensity level at which Russia is willing to intervene. H2 argues that Russia is more
likely to intervene aggressively against a non-NATO member NA state when that state is already
making significant progress toward NATO accession. H3 contends that Russia is more willing to
increase its intervention intensity level when it can rely upon a method that provides plausible
deniability. H4 argues that Russia’s economic capacity determines whether it intervenes at a high
intensity level.

H1: Near abroad states with NATO membership are more likely to successfully achieve general deterrence toward
Russia.
NATO, a security alliance between the United States and many powerful European states,
including France, the United Kingdom and (formerly West) Germany, was the principal adversary of
the USSR’s Warsaw Pact alliance during the Cold War. After the USSR’s disintegration, NATO
remained intact. The alliance is now the dominant institution for transatlantic security cooperation
and is buttressed considerably by the conventional and nuclear capabilities of the U.S.
H1 posits that after a post-Soviet state enters NATO, it acquires an enhanced capacity for
deterring Russian aggression. NATO’s central premise is that all member states will defend any
member in the event of a direct military conflict. The alliance’s effectiveness hinges upon the ability
of all member states to invoke Article V, which is a mutual defense pact obligating the entire alliance
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to provide military assistance if a member is attacked. This mechanism for summoning the military
might of powerful European states, but even more importantly, of the U.S., serves as a strong
deterrent for Russian aggression against NATO members. H1 therefore assumes that Russia
operates in an environment in which it seeks to avoid a military confrontation against NATO.
A skeptic of the significance of alliances could argue that Russia might wager that the U.S.
would not support Estonia when its immediate foreign policy goals do not justify the costs of such
protection. In this scenario, Russia might consider escalating its interventions against Estonia. Yet,
even though military alliances have not historically served as absolute guarantees of mutual support,
the risk of retaliation created by a state’s NATO membership may prove a sufficient deterrent
mechanism. It is true that the alliance cannot ensure third party support during conflict beyond a
reasonable doubt; NATO suffers from the same lingering possibility of defection as all other
alliances. Yet, for the NATO alliance to successfully dissuade Russian high-intensity intervention
against a member, the threat of a NATO response does not need to be absolute and beyond any
doubt, but simply credible. Rather than proving it will intervene, the alliance must merely
communicate that the probability of NATO intervention (and, by extension, the imposition of
unacceptable costs) is large enough to prove too risky for Russia.
Non-cooperative game theorist James Morrow reasons that costly signaling increases a
military alliance’s credibility, supporting the argument that Russia is unlikely to intervene at the level
of military invasion against NATO members. Successful alliances rely upon states’ self-enforcement
of obligations both to function effectively and to communicate the alliance’s strength to would-be
attackers.4 Morrow explains that because alliances impose costs on members, states will only enter

Morrow, James D. “Alliances: Why Write Them Down?” Annual Review of Political Science 3, no. 1
(2000): 63.
4
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alliances with other states if they share meaningful interests and if they anticipate meeting their
commitments in the event of war.5 These costs often take the form of audience costs, meaning
leaders will face domestic and international ridicule if they do not support an ally. Joining the alliance
requires the undertaking of these new costs in the event of failure to defend allies; had the leaders
not entered the alliance, they would not have experienced this ridicule. The formal alliance is
therefore a commitment device incentivizing the defense of any member targeted by Russia, since
the inherent costs of failing to defend that state are higher than they would have been in a world
without the alliance.6 Addressing NATO specifically, Morrow argues that NATO’s extensive
peacetime military coordination increases the odds that the allies will succeed if they fight together,
which in turn increases the likelihood that NATO states will defend each other.7
These factors increase the likelihood that Russia will anticipate that NATO will honor its
commitment to defend its members. Since Russia does not seek to provoke a conflict against
U.S.-led NATO forces, even if it maintains some level of intervention against NATO states, it will
refrain from escalating this aggression to the point of overt military conflict.

H1A: The United States’ credibility positively affects near abroad states’ abilities to deter Russia.
A sub-hypothesis of H1, H1A argues that U.S. credibility as a potential defender impacts the
degree to which Russia intervenes against NA states. Due to the U.S.’s central role within NATO’s
military core and strategic direction, this paper focuses largely on the U.S. rather than other NATO

Ibid, 73.
Ibid, 72.
7
Ibid, 71.
5
6
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states. Essentially, Russia’s assessment of the likelihood of a U.S. response determines whether it
escalates its interventions. This credibility hinges upon two major factors: capacity and willingness.
If Russia believes that U.S. military capacity would enable it to win a military confrontation
and assumes the U.S. might intervene, Russia is unlikely to escalate its aggression against NA states
to the level of military intervention. One indicator of U.S. capability would be a recent display of its
ability to accomplish its military objectives abroad. When the U.S. can demonstrate the effectiveness
of its conventional military, Russia is less likely to risk any confrontation that could trigger a U.S.
military response. Likewise, if the U.S. military performs poorly, it suffers a reputational loss that
may embolden actors like Russia. Another indicator of capacity for intervention against Russia is
whether the U.S. has the ready supply of forces, materials and funding necessary for a military
intervention. Substantial U.S. military involvement in other areas of the world would decrease the
availability of such necessities and would therefore reduce U.S. capacity.
This deterrence relies upon not only demonstrated U.S. military capacity but also the
perceived degree of U.S. willingness to directly confront a global power like Russia. This willingness
can be predicted by the shifts over time in the U.S.’s international reputation as an actor likely to
intervene abroad. The U.S. is less likely to convince Russia of its willingness to intervene in an
eastern European conflict when its military is entrenched in other conflicts around the world. This is
due to material constraints limiting the number of major conflicts in which the U.S. can afford to
participate at one time. The level of prior U.S. engagement elsewhere therefore influences the degree
to which Russia may increase the intensity level of its interventions against NA states, as this
decreases the likelihood of U.S. willingness to commit further forces to a new conflict. Furthermore,
the U.S. is unlikely to engage in further military conflicts if it is experiencing a significant domestic
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crisis at the time, as the population is unlikely to approve of allocation of significant funding for that
purpose.
Russia is also more likely to intervene when the U.S. has recently failed to act in situations
that would have logically warranted U.S. intervention given its strategic interests. When the U.S.
intervenes consistently to aid other countries, Russia is likely to anticipate new U.S. interventions.
Yet, if the U.S. has not intervened in situations in which it indicated it would or situations that appear
to align with its interests, the implied odds of a new U.S. intervention are decreased. Due to the
democratic nature of the U.S. government, however, other critical factors affect this calculation. If
the U.S. is already entrenched in conflicts that are faring poorly or unpopular among the U.S.
population, the collective political will to enter a new conflict among U.S. leaders and policymakers,
who often consider their reelection prospects when making decisions, is unlikely.
Thus, the variation of U.S. credibility, consisting of its capacity and reputation of willingness
as perceived by Russia, influences the degree of escalation that Russia undertakes in its interventions.

H2: Overt NATO deliberations surrounding an NA state’s possible entry without officially giving membership
decrease that state’s ability to deter Russia.
H2 claims that Russia is more likely to intervene in an NA state’s affairs when that state is
significantly strengthening its relationship with NATO but is not yet a member. This hypothesis
draws upon the predictions of H1 and assumes that Russia is indeed deterred to a higher degree
when a state has achieved NATO membership, as a result of the Article V collective defense
mechanism’s implications. Therefore, the inclusion of additional countries into NATO increases the
number of states that possess this potent deterrent capability. This appears particularly threatening
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to Russia when NATO expands eastward, into Russia’s neighborhood. Russia bristles at the prospect
of former Soviet states, which it considers within its cultural, economic and security spheres of
influence, foregoing closer ties with Russia in favor of NATO accession. Russia therefore regards
NATO efforts to bring former Soviet states into the alliance as a direct threat.
H2 is rooted in James Fearon’s theory that commitment problems between rational states
incentivize preventive interventions. Fearon explains that even when states accurately perceive each
other’s capabilities and motivations, war may still occur instead of successful peaceful bargaining. In
a situation with two mutually distrustful states, when one state has the prospect of becoming more
powerful in the future, the other state is more likely to escalate its intervention against its adversary.
Yet, Fearon argues, separately from the classic argument that states intervene preventively to prevent
future dangerous attacks, that the disadvantaged state will instead intervene because it anticipates a
new peaceful status quo that it will find unacceptable.8 As applied to the relationship between Russia
and an NA state hoping for NATO accession, this situation arises from the strong deterrent
capabilities provided by NATO membership, which are discussed in H1. Therefore, although Russia
would accept a situation in which NA states join NATO but promise credibly to abide by Russian
preferences, after the NA states achieve NATO membership, they have greater incentives to
disregard inconvenient Russian preferences. Russia therefore cannot trust such pre-NATO accession
commitments made by NA states and, consequently, has an incentive to act preventively.
As a result of this dilemma, Russia is likely to act assertively when NA states approach
NATO membership. This intervention is a preventive strategy intended to freeze the process of the
state’s integration into NATO. Russian intervention achieves this through two distinct but related

8

Fearon, James. “Rationalist Explanations for War.” International Organization 49, no. 3 (1995): 406.
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effects. Firstly, intervention serves to unhinge the target country’s political stability, convincing
NATO that the NA state is an unstable liability and could require undesirable deployments of
NATO aid. Demonstrated political stability within a state has essentially served as a prerequisite for
NATO accession, and states experiencing domestic turmoil are unlikely to prove theirs.
Furthermore, this intervention signals that Russia, openly regarding eastward NATO expansion as a
threat to its territorial integrity, remains risk-acceptant regarding this issue and could initiate a fight
over the NA state in question.
These strategies benefit Russia directly. By discouraging further NATO moves to
incorporate the NA state into the alliance, Russia isolates the state from European integration and
incentivizes the state to turn toward Russia for strategic cooperation. Ultimately, this should be
visible through increased Russian intervention at times of substantial progress in the state’s accession
efforts. The inverse of this idea should remain true; Russia has less incentive to intervene and
disrupt the NATO accession process when an NA state’s relations with NATO are demonstrably
poor and the state remains far from accession. Therefore, for H2 to be supported, increased Russian
intervention during or after periods of serious cooperation and progress toward accession should be
observable.

H3: Near abroad states are less likely to successfully deter Russia if Russia is able to use a covert method of attack.
H3 asserts that Russia is more likely to intervene if it can do so in a manner that provides
plausible deniability. Undesirable consequences for overt intervention can range from economic
repercussions, like sanctions enacted by the international community, to military responses. Yet, if
Russia can achieve its goals while leaving little evidence of its meddling, it can plausibly deny
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accusations against it, increasing the odds of avoiding these negative responses. If Russia can pursue
strategic objectives while maintaining diplomatic distance from the events, it is more likely to select
into intervention situations. It will pursue any intervention to the highest possible intensity level at
which it can plausibly deny any responsibility. Therefore, Russia is more likely to intervene in
situations in which it can rely upon proxy forces to accomplish its objectives or to create the
deception that its troops are actually local, nonaffiliated groups. Similarly, Russia is likely to rely upon
cyber intervention in conjunction with higher level kinetic intervention or, if significantly deterred,
in lieu of kinetic intervention. By employing these strategies, Russia can escalate to the point of
low-level military action with reduced fear of meaningful international retribution.

H4: The extent of Russian intervention in the affairs of near abroad states reflects the strength of the Russian
economic strategic position.
H4 argues that Russia’s economic capacity is a significant factor driving its escalatory
behavior. Escalating interventions to the point of military action incurs significant expenses for
states. When economic conditions are poor in Russia, the resulting low capacity may prove
prohibitive for high-level interventions abroad, as politicians are likely to divert the required funds to
domestic needs. Beyond the inherent cost of military intervention, if Russia’s economy has been
performing poorly, the government simply is less likely to pursue interventions that could risk
harmful international responses. Russia must anticipate the possibility of severe international
economic sanctions in response to aggressive military actions against neighboring states. The
restrictive effect of this risk can be identified in periods like the 1990s, when the Russian economy
contracted significantly. Although the economic collapse affected the Russian oil industry, oil exports
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still constituted a major portion of the government’s revenue.9 Any international sanctions against
these Russian exports would have devastated such a weak and narrowly focused export economy.
Yet, this principle also applies throughout the early 2000s, when the growing economy depended
upon exports of oil and natural gas.10 Russian leaders were simply less likely to risk aggressive
behaviors that could provoke devastating sanctions against these essential exports. Each of these
factors inhibits significant Russian intervention during periods of economic vulnerability.
When Russia achieves economic strength, escalating intervention to higher intensity levels
becomes possible. While Russia was unable to act beyond low-intensity measures during its weak
period, it now has the capacity to launch interventions in support of its interests. A resurgent
economy both allows for the direct costs of expensive interventions and enables Russia to withstand
the indirect costs of intense intervention. Once economically stable, Russia can consider
intervention in desirable situations.

Alternative Hypotheses
Although the hypotheses listed above were the final hypotheses selected for examination,
several other hypotheses were initially considered as well. These two alternative hypotheses were the
“domestic diversion” hypothesis and the “territorial annexation” hypothesis.

Vatansever, Adnan. “Russia’s Oil Exports: Economic Rationale Versus Strategic Gains.” Carnegie
Papers. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, December 2010. p. 5.
10
Ibid, p. 5.
9
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The Domestic Diversion Hypothesis
Although the “diversion” hypothesis initially appeared to add a new and valuable dimension
to the examination, closer analysis reveals significant weaknesses. When I considered whether any
specific factors within Russian domestic politics could partially explain patterns of Russian
intervention in NA states, I was initially intrigued by the idea that Russian leaders could intervene at
times of political weakness as a diversionary tactic. Yet, further scrutiny reveals that the historical
record of Russian intervention in Ukraine, Georgia and Estonia does not reflect this concept.
Polling shows former Russian President Boris Yeltsin’s approval ratings remained largely
below the 40% mark after 1993 and below 30% after 1994. His ratings dipped to between 20% and
10% approval between 1995 and 1996, and they remained below 10% from late 1998 until his
resignation.11 Yet, Russia did not engage in significant intervention in its near abroad (or elsewhere)
throughout this period. During Russian President Vladimir Putin’s initial 2000-2008 tenure, his
annual approval ratings ranged from 66% to 85%, with his lowest points occurring in 2005 (66%)
and 2000, his first year in office (70%).12 These low points compare favorably to those of other
Russian presidents.
Outside of Putin’s ratings, the most notable moments of public disapproval during his first
two terms occurred in response to the 2000 Kursk submarine accident, Putin’s 2002 hostage crisis
response and Putin’s 2004 hostage crisis response.13 In contradiction to this hypothesis, Russian
intervention in the three countries did not approach significant levels at any of these hotspots; the

Treisman, Daniel. “Presidential Popularity in a Hybrid Regime: Russia under Yeltsin and Putin.”
American Journal of Political Science 55, no. 3 (January 2011): 590–609.
12
“Vladimir Putin's Approval Rating Russia 2000 to 2020.” Statista, March 24, 2020.
13
“Timeline: Vladimir Putin - 20 Tumultuous Years as Russian President or PM.” Reuters. Thomson
Reuters, August 9, 2019.
11
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2007 cyber operations against Estonia occurred in the context of 72% approval (2006) and 81%
approval (2007). Former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev’s approval ratings ranged between
56% and 78% during his 2008-2012 term.14 His 2007 approval totaled 65%, while he received 76%
approval in 2008, the year in which Russia intervened against Georgia. He was not in a position of
weakness at the time of intervention, and the crisis had its roots during Putin’s term in 2007.
Furthermore, during Medvedev’s presidency, Putin, who had been forced to the role of prime
minister by legal bars on consecutive presidential terms, controlled the government’s major
decision-making.15 During Putin’s second presidential tenure (2012-present), his lowest ratings points
were 63% (2013) and 2019 (64%). The 2013 point does precede Russia’s 2014 intervention; yet, that
year did not represent a steep decline from his popularity in 2012 (68%) or 2011 (69%). Protests
around potential voter fraud influencing Putin’s reelection had occurred since 2011. Rather than
corresponding to the latest point in a three-year trend, the 2014 intervention appears to correlate
much more closely with the early 2014 deposition of Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych.
Furthermore, a proponent of the diversionary explanation would expect leaders to intervene
abroad directly before elections to boost their domestic standings; these case studies do not provide
any evidence to support this notion. Russian presidential elections occurred in 1991, 1996, 2000,
2004, 2008, 2012 and 2018. The only significant interventions that occurred during the three cases
were in 2007, 2008 and 2014. The 2008 intervention in Georgia occurred late in the year, while the
election occurred previously in March. Russian intervention against Estonia occurred in May 2007,
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nearly a year before the election. None of these interventions, therefore, occur directly before
presidential elections.
These preliminary findings reflect Taylor Fravel’s criticisms of the diversionary hypothesis. In
his examination of two case studies, he finds standard realist foreign policy and “coercive
diplomacy” to have played a far greater role in the instances of intervention than domestic politics.16
I reach the same conclusion in this case and align my findings with his critique.
Russian intervention did not reach a significant level during the vast majority of leaders’
domestic weak points, and two of its highest intensity intervention points — the 2007 cyber
intervention in Estonia and 2008 Russo-Georgian War — do not correlate with weak periods. While
the third significant intervention point, the 2014 Russian actions in Ukraine, roughly follows a
slightly weak point for Putin, it is more directly linked to events in Ukraine. As a result of this lack of
plausible validity, I did not examine this hypothesis further.

The Territorial Annexation Hypothesis
The second alternative hypothesis initially considered for examination was that NA states
might be less likely to successfully deter Russian intervention over territorial sovereignty disputes.
Yet, multiple separate arguments challenge this notion. Firstly, it is possible that Russian intervention
to resolve territorial disputes reflects an opposite causation; essentially, Russia does not use force
specifically because of territorial disputes, but it instead intervenes more intensely in such disputes
during periods when it feels comfortable using force.
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Secondly, Russia has often only intervened after years or decades since the onset of its
disputes, reducing the likelihood of a sovereignty dispute serving as the independent variable.
Russia’s major interventions over territorial sovereignty have occurred after long periods of time
since the dispute initially arose or was resolved. For example, while Russia claimed Crimean territory
in the early 1990s, it was not until 2014 that Russian soldiers facilitated a Crimean referendum that
Russia’s leadership then cited as justification for the integration of Crimea into Russia. Similarly,
although Russia had supported the separatist republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia
since Georgia’s exit from the Soviet Union, it only intervened overtly and officially recognized their
independence in 2008. While these interventions occur in the context of sovereignty disputes,
Russia’s decisions to use force stem from other external triggers.
In instances of Russian intervention over territorial sovereignty disputes, Russia’s level of
comfort in using force in response to external stimuli may result in higher level intervention, rather
than the opposite causation. This is especially visible in some of its most significant and intense
interventions, which actually occurred several decades after their origins. As a result of the unclear
(and perhaps unfavorable) causal linkage, this hypothesis was also ultimately not included in the
thesis.

Chapter 3: The Case Studies
Ukraine: Historical Overview
The Ukraine case study supports this paper’s argument, setting a foundation for Russian
behavior toward non-NATO member NA states. The case contains flashpoints for potential Russian
intervention in 1993, 2004 and 2014. Out of these, Russia intervened at a significant level only in
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2014. This supports the periodized argument that Russia will refrain from escalation during
economically weak periods but will intervene at significant intensity levels against non-NATO NA
states after economic revival. A description of relevant historical events throughout Ukraine’s
relationships with both Russia and NATO will support discussion of the hypotheses.
Ukraine and Russia have a lengthy and contentious historical relationship. The Muscovite
Empire, which would later evolve into the Russian Empire, annexed eastern Ukraine in the sixteenth
century. After the Russian tsar fell and the Bolshevik uprising commenced in 1917, the Ukrainian
People’s Republic briefly declared independence before the Soviet Union absorbed it in 1921.
Western and Eastern Ukraine then functioned as one region under the Soviet Union.17 The
Ukrainian Supreme Soviet declared independence in 1991.18
Ukrainian cooperation with NATO began early in the independent country’s post-Soviet
history, as it joined the alliance’s North Atlantic Cooperation Council in 1991. Partnership gradually
increased during the mid-1990s with solid first steps of cooperation, such as Ukraine’s 1994 entry
into the Partnership for Peace (PFP) initiative, 1996 deployment of Ukrainian soldiers to NATO’s
peacekeeping operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1997 construction of the NATO Information
and Documentation Centre in Kyiv and 1999 deployment of the Polish-Ukrainian Battalion to aid
NATO’s Kosovo peacekeeping operation.19 Throughout the 1990s, Russia encouraged Ukraine to
join its own post-Soviet multilateral regional institution, the Commonwealth of Independent States
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(CIS). It was instead forced to watch Ukraine form close ties with the security alliance founded
expressly to counter the USSR — likely a stinging irony.
During and after the breakdown of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, numerous
disagreements emerged between Ukraine and Russia over the new political status of Crimea. These
revolved around the national status of Crimea but also the status of the Crimean port of Sevastopol,
which served as the Soviet Black Sea Fleet base. While a 1991 Crimean referendum reestablished the
Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic within the USSR, the superpower’s formal
dissolution and the subsequent emergence of an independent Ukraine resulted in a Supreme Council
of Crimea vote to declare Crimean independence and establish an independent government. After
significant tension and additional Ukrainian concessions, however, the Crimean constitution was
amended to designate Crimea as an area within Ukraine.20 Within this time period, Russia and
Ukraine agreed to divide the Black Sea Fleet at Sevastopol. The Crimeans then pressured Ukraine
for additional freedoms, and its parliament’s leadership advocated for the devolution of presidential
powers to the territory.
Emboldened by evident factionalism among Crimeans, Russian officials openly challenged
Ukraine’s claims to Crimea and stoked dissent within the territory.21 The Russian deputy declared
Russia’s willingness to oversee a Crimean independence referendum and to recognize the territory as
an independent CIS polity. Further challenges over Crimea emanated from the Russian Supreme
Soviet, as it declared the 1954 transfer of Crimea from the USSR to Ukraine to be illegal. When
former Russian Vice President Alexander Rutskoi traveled to Crimea in 1992, he advocated for the
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territory to secede from Ukraine.22 The following year, the Supreme Soviet nearly unanimously voted
in a law “enshrining the federal status of the town of Sevastopol in the Russian Federation
constitution.”23 Pro-Russian groups within Crimea reacted accordingly. Within the month, a leader of
the Russian Society of Crimea asserted the group’s desire to force the transfer of Crimea into
Russian jurisdiction through violent rebellion.24 After additional tension for several years, Russia and
Ukraine eventually signed the 1997 Ukraine-Russia Friendship Treaty, which leased Sevastopol to the
Russian navy and officially split the Black Sea Fleet, with the majority under Russian control.25
Ukrainians perceived the deal as heavily weighted toward Russia and potentially problematic for
Ukrainian security.26
The internal Crimean political situation was volatile throughout this period, in part due to
the administration of Yuriy Meshkov, who was elected Crimean President in 1994. An ethnic Russian
and former KGB guard, Meshkov ran on a platform of closer Crimean-Russian relations and
dominated the election. In office, he wrestled with the Kiev government for further Crimean
autonomy, refused to relinquish control of the Ministry of the Interior to Ukraine, established
Crimean defense offices and pushed for mandatory Crimean conscription.27 In line with his election
platform, Meshkov sought to establish closer relations with Russia and attempted to secure
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circulation of the ruble in Crimea. From the late 1990s to the early 2000s, Russia and Ukraine
remained highly economically mutually reliant, and no potential flashpoints emerged.28
Although Ukraine strengthened its cooperation with NATO throughout the 1990s, the early
2000s marked a difficult period for the alliance and Ukraine. After the U.S. accused Ukraine of
selling early-warning radar technology to Iraq and breaking a United Nations embargo,
NATO-Ukraine relations soured. This rift became humiliatingly evident for Ukraine at the 2002
NATO Prague summit. NATO downsized a meeting with Ukraine to a minister-level session, asked
Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma to refrain from attending the summit and shifted his seat away
from the United States’ and the United Kingdom’s leaders after he disregarded this request.29
Despite Kuchma’s 2002 declaration of his intent to bring Ukraine into the NATO alliance, the 2002
creation of an Action Plan at the Prague summit and 2003 Ukrainain commitments to send
peacekeepers to Iraq, relations between NATO and Ukraine remained icy.30 Yet, the following year’s
events considerably altered the dynamic between Ukraine, NATO and Russia.
Ukraine’s 2004 Orange Revolution, centered around that year’s presidential elections,
presented serious concerns for Russia. Erupting only one year after the Georgian Rose Revolution,
in which protesters ousted the Russia-friendly Georgian leadership in favor of pro-Western leaders,
the Orange Revolution manifested Russian fears of Ukraine’s turn toward the West. Despite his
eligibility to pursue a third term, Kuchma, the incumbent, endorsed the candidacy of Viktor
Yanukovych, who was backed publicly by Russian President Vladimir Putin.31 The campaign
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highlighted a significant geographical divide, as Yanukovych’s pro-Russian stance earned him the
support of eastern Ukraine, with its substantial ethnic Russian population and favorable attitude
toward Russia, while Yanukovych’s opponent, Viktor Yushchenko, drew his support primarily from
western Ukraine.32 In the leadup to the election, Yushchenko was with dioxin, a move often
attributed to the Ukrainian Security Service but also potentially linked to Russia by telephone
transcripts.33
Yanukovych initially declared victory after the election runoff, but Yushchenko supporters
alleged election fraud, based on election monitor reports.34 Suspiciously, Putin publicly lauded
Yanukovych’s success before the Central Election Committee even announced the winner.35
Yushchenko’s supporters then assembled the public protests that would become known as the
Orange Revolution.36 For weeks, hundreds of thousands of demonstrators marched, and
approximately one million protesters peacefully occupied the streets of Kiev.37 Yanukovych’s
campaign urged for counterdemonstrations in his eastern strongholds, and some of his eastern
supporters threatened secession.38 The Ukrainian Supreme Court declared the first runoff invalid,
and a second runoff vote commenced under heavy international scrutiny. Yushchenko emerged
victorious and, despite Yanukovych’s legal allegations of an invalid election, the courts and election
committee upheld the results. This marked the ascendance of Yushchenko, a leader aiming to build
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closer relationships between the West and Ukraine, and the removal of Putin-backed Moscow ally
Yanukovych. Yet, at this point, the Russian military remained within Russian borders, and Ukrainian
territorial integrity remained intact.39 Nevertheless, Putin’s Russia was clearly shaken by the Orange
Revolution, as it responded by increasing the Russian government’s internal central control over
non-governmental organizations and forming new political organizations.40
In the years following the Orange Revolution, the new Ukrainian leadership was fraught with
tension. Rapid cabinet turnovers and infighting between Yushchenko and other leaders of the
revolution, such as Yuliya Tymoshenko, hobbled the new government’s hopes for stable and
effective governance.41 In 2006, Yushchenko pushed for a NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP)
— essentially a guided plan for achieving the conditions necessary for NATO membership. Russia’s
disapproval of this direction glared in Defence Minister Sergey Ivanov’s 2006 warning of the
“negative consequences” that would follow a Ukrainian NATO accession.42 However, after a
parliamentary defeat forced Yushchenko to name Yanukovych his prime minister, Yanukovych’s
direct opposition to the MAP prevented any progress and effectively shelved the country’s pursuit of
NATO membership.43
In 2008, with the support of new prime minister Tymoshenko and the parliament,
Yushchenko again pushed for a MAP. Russia again vocalized its opposition, and despite the support
of U.S. President George W. Bush, numerous NATO leaders, reluctant to sour the alliance’s relations
with Russia, declined Yushchenko’s application.44 Yet, NATO leaders still proclaimed that Ukraine
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would eventually join NATO. Russia’s outspoken opposition persisted.45 Later in the year, as
Yushchenko and Putin stood together at a public speech, Putin threatened to aim nuclear weapons
at Ukraine if Ukraine were to join NATO, and the chief of the Russian general staff predicted that
military action would follow a Ukrainian NATO accession.46 That year, Russia and Ukraine also
feuded over transfers of Russian gas, and the Ukrainian economy began to tank from the effects of
the global recession.47 By the end of Yushchenko’s term, his approval ratings stood at a dismal 4
percent.48
Yanukovych emerged victorious in the 2010 election and ousted Yushchenko, the politician
who had defeated him five years prior. Although Yanukovych maintained cooperation with NATO
throughout his term, he declared in 2010 that Ukrainian membership in NATO was an “unrealistic
prospect” and officially removed the issue from the Ukrainian agenda. His foreign policy focused on
building positive relationships with Russia.49
Yanukovych’s complicated attitude toward incorporating Ukraine into the West would result
in Ukraine’s largest political crisis since the Orange Revolution: the Euromaidan protests.
Yanukovych, sensitive to Russian threats of a gas cutoff, chose to renege on a popular 2013 planned
association agreement with the European Union and prepared to reorient trade toward Russia.50
Protesters occupied the Kiev city hall with demands for the president’s immediate resignation. These
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protests evolved into riots, and when Yanukovych attempted to sign laws to constrain protesting
rights, hundreds of thousands of protesters responded in the Kiev streets. These riots became
violent, with substantial bloodshed between protesters and police. The protests spread to eastern
Ukraine, Yanukovych’s former stronghold of support. After protesters occupied the justice ministry,
the parliament removed restrictions on protesting. Yet, the brief respite in violence ended after the
parliamentary opposition failed to secure limitations on presidential power. The European Union
enacted sanctions against Ukraine after Yanukovych again resorted to violence against the protesters.
On February 21, the EU worked to create a peace agreement between Yanukovych and the
opposition, while the parliament granted amnesty to the protesters and voted to impeach
Yanukovych. While a member of Tymoshenko’s Fatherland party assumed the role of acting
president, Yanukovych fled the country and later reemerged in Russia, decrying what he viewed as a
coup.
Russia’s next steps represented a notable shift in Russian Ukraine policy. As the Euromaidan
protesters occupied government buildings and flooded the streets, the Sevastopol City Council had
urged the creation of Crimean defense squads to defend the city.51 This decision may have been
spurred by Russian media claims that militarized Ukrainian nationalists would travel from Kiev to
Crimea.52 Immediately after Yanukovych fled Ukraine and reappeared across the Russian border,
Russian special operations forces were deployed to covertly take over key civic and infrastructural
sites in Crimea. Although the deployed units had no insignias to betray their Russian identities, their
weaponry, fatigues, accents and equipment clearly identified them to observers as professional
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Russian soldiers.53 The newly formed Russian Special Operations Command occupied the Crimean
parliament building, securing the election of Sergei Askyonov as prime minister and seizing major
Ukrainian compounds.54 Numerous Crimean lawmakers alleged that despite their absences from the
building, their votes were counted as supporting Askyonov’s election.55 While Putin initially claimed
that the “little green men” occupying buildings were Crimean separatists, the Crimean defense
groups appear to have instead played a largely cosmetic role in the operation, providing a “local
image.”56 In the midst of the crisis, Putin secured permission from his Federation Council to deploy
Russian forces to Ukraine for the purposes of stabilization.57 In under three weeks after the
Russians’ takeover of the Crimean parliament, after another rigged referendum, Askyrov’s new
government and the Russian government signed a March treaty to facilitate the accession of Crimea
into Russia. A week later, the Ukrainian military units in Crimea surrendered, marking the
completion of a bloodless annexation of Crimea.58 Russian military exercises along the
Russia-Ukraine border pressured Ukraine to accept the shift in status quo.59
The next phase of direct Russian intervention in Ukraine, the war in the Donbas region of
eastern Ukraine, has proved far more violent. While the region had served as a source of support for
Yanukovych, violent clashes between supporters and opponents of the Euromaidan uprising
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escalated after March.60 Key journalists and local Ukrainian officials identified a mounting presence
of the military intelligence forces of the General Staff of the Armed Forces (GRU) in the region as
early as March, directly after the Crimean crisis and nearly a month before hostilities erupted in the
east.61 From April 7 to April 14, armed pro-Russian squads took over government buildings in the
eastern cities of Donetsk and Luhansk, before reinforcing separatists secured substantial amounts of
ground in the surrounding Donetsk and Luhansk provinces.62 These separatists proceeded to
establish breakaway entities called the People’s Republics of Donetsk and Luhansk in mid-2014.
Remarkably, Russian intelligence agencies appear to have been involved in recruiting
separatists and organizing different militant groups into a central separatist army. In late 2014,
regular Russian troops engaged in combat to prevent the separatists from defeat against Ukrainian
forces, and Russia has continued to supply manpower and weapons to the separatists; however,
Russia maintains it has not been involved.63 Ukraine and the separatists signed the Minsk
Agreements in 2014 and 2015 to establish conditions for a ceasefire and territorial reintegration, but
these agreements remain ineffective.64 The conflict has raged on for years, but no new opportunities
for Russia to intervene on a new front have emerged.
Throughout this entire period of relations between Ukraine and Russia, multiple
opportunities have emerged during which Russia could have acted to intervene in Ukrainian affairs
and secure political gains. The scenarios this paper considers the most likely to result in Russian
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intervention are the 1992-1993 Russian meddling in Crimea, the 2004 Orange Revolution, the 2014
annexation of Crimea and the 2014 war in Donbas. Since both 2014 conflicts stemmed from the
2013 Euromaidan protests, this paper often treats them together when examining causation of
intervention. The dependent variable of Russian intervention varies across these incidents. Russia
refrained from intervening militarily in the early 1990s and during the Orange Revolution, but it
intervened to annex Crimea and stoke separatist conflict in Donbas. Due to the similarities across
these incidents, this thesis questions why Russia chose to intervene in 2014 but not in 1993 or 2004.

Ukraine: Hypothesis Analysis
H1: Near abroad states with NATO membership are more likely to successfully achieve general deterrence toward
Russia.
H1 proposes that near abroad (NA) states with official NATO membership possess an
enhanced capacity for general deterrence toward Russia, implying that Russia, fearing a failure to
achieve its strategic objectives or fearing unacceptable retaliation, is less likely to initiate challenges
against these states. The inverse follows; NA states that do not possess NATO memberships, all
other factors remaining equal, are less likely to successfully achieve general deterrence toward Russia
and prevent an initial challenge to the status quo. Russia, according to this logic, is likely to display an
increased propensity for intervening in Ukraine’s affairs. This propensity should take the form of
increased likelihood of interventions of disproportionately high intensity levels for non-NATO
member NA states like Ukraine.
The Ukraine case does not have direct bearing on H1, as there is no internal variation of the
independent variable (Ukraine’s NATO status) within this case. This limits this case’s relevance to
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the discussion of H1. However, it does support the inverse implications of H1. Throughout the case,
the IV remains constant, as Ukraine has never become a NATO member, although the country’s
leadership has professed varying degrees of desire to join NATO over time. However, Ukraine’s
relations with Russia can contribute evidence to a theoretical baseline level of intervention that
Russia is willing to take against non-NATO member NA states.
H1’s inverse implications predict Ukraine to have a lesser capability of initially deterring
Russian challenges than NA NATO members like Estonia. Several flashpoints in the Ukraine-Russia
bilateral relationship confirm Ukraine’s difficulty in deterring Russia, while other flashpoints pose
challenges for the prediction. The primary shift in Russian behavior is visible between the 1993 and
2004 instances of Russian nonintervention and the Russian intervention in the 2014 Euromaidan
protests.
The 1993 flashpoint, which marks that decade’s apex of Russian governmental efforts to
stoke dissent within Crimea, does not necessarily support the hypothesis’ implications. According to
H1, this is a situation in which Russia is more likely to intervene at a high intensity, but Russia did
not escalate at this point. Yet, it is notable that Russian leadership opted for political intervention, in
the form of Rutskoi’s and the Russian deputy’s suggestion of Crimean secession, as well as the
Supreme Soviet’s votes to condemn the transfer of Crimea to Ukraine and to claim Sevastopol as
Russian territory.
The Orange Revolution also does not provide supportive evidence for this prediction. The
nullification of the election of Yanukovych — who Putin publicly backed — and the Orange
Revolution’s massive organized protests evidently led to serious consternation in the Kremlin.
Despite this, Russia refrained from escalating against Ukraine. The subsequent defeat of Yanukovych
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and victory of Yushchenko, who aimed to orient Ukraine toward NATO, likely heightened Russian
concerns. Relative to Fearon’s ideas, it is notable that Ukraine did not pursue a particularly moderate
policy to avoid provoking Russia. In this scenario, the evident commitment problem suggests the
possibility of Russian escalation to prevent an unacceptable shift in status quo. The extended process
of supporting Yushchenko’s claims and opting for further elections marks a point at which H1
would predict Russian escalation. Yet, despite Ukraine’s non-member NATO status, Russia chose to
refrain from more intense intervention.
When a comparable predicament emerged ten years later, however, Russia opted for
intervention. The 2013 Euromaidan protests were sparked by Yanukovych’s retraction of his
commitment to achieve closer European integration through a European Union Association
Agreement, due to Russian pressure. To Russia, this situation presented a provocation similar to the
Orange Revolution. The Orange Revolution protests nullified the fraudulent election of Russia’s
preferred candidate in favor of a pro-NATO candidate, while the Euromaidan protests ousted a
candidate with pro-Russian views because he failed to achieve a closer relationship with the
European Union. Although these situations presented comparable stimuli to Russia, one situation
resulted in intervention and one did not.
Ultimately, because Ukraine has never joined NATO and the IV therefore remains constant,
the Ukraine case study is most useful to H1 because it reflects Russia’s willingness to interfere
militarily in the affairs of a non-NATO state. This supports the inverse implications of H1 and will
provide a useful comparison relative to the other case studies.

Rabin 36
H1A: The United States’ credibility positively affects near abroad states’ abilities to deter Russia.
The U.S.’s credibility as an actor willing to use force is an important factor that directly
influences the effectiveness of NATO deterrence. The three primary flashpoints in
Ukrainian-Russian relations where Russian military intervention was a possibility are the 1993 height
of bilateral tensions over Crimea, the 2004 Orange Revolution and 2014 Euromaidan protests. If the
case supports H1A, Russia will be less likely to intervene after events indicating the U.S.’s willingness
to use force in response to threats or to enforce American deterrent threats. Similarly, it will be more
likely to intervene after events implying that the U.S. is not willing to use force in comparable
situations.
In the early 1990s, the U.S. military was an exceptionally credible force. The U.S. emerged as
the sole hegemon in a unipolar world at the expense of the USSR, the legal predecessor of Russia.
Furthermore, the U.S. demonstrated both its conventional power and its willingness to intervene
abroad in its 1990 Desert Shield and 1991 Desert Storm operations.
In the three years preceding the Orange Revolution, the United States had invoked the
NATO Article V mutual defense clause to oust the Taliban from power in Afghanistan, defeat
Saddam Hussein in Iraq and combat the remaining insurgents in the region.65 This sequence gave
the U.S. enormous credibility as the most powerful conventional military in the world and added
substantially to NATO’s deterrent credibility at the time of the Revolution.
However, the events of the decade following the Orange Revolution negatively impacted the
U.S.’s reliability as a force willing to launch an invasion in defense of a non-NATO country. For
nearly a decade, the U.S.’s displays of power in Iraq and Afghanistan had degraded into long, costly
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and unpopular counterinsurgency operations.66 The American public was weary of fighting such
wars abroad. Another incident, in which Russia played a direct role, expedited the decline of
American credibility. In late 2013, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad evidently crossed a “red line”
previously established by President Obama: the use of chemical weapons on civilians. Based on the
expectations established by the red line comment, U.S. intervention should have occurred. However,
Assad’s ally Putin mobilized Russian naval vessels in the region, in combination with hawkish public
messaging. Obama then failed to enforce the red line, and Russia chose to annex Crimea mere
months later.67 H1A is therefore supported by the timeline of events in the Ukraine case study.

H2: Overt NATO deliberations surrounding an NA state’s possible entry without officially giving membership
decrease that state’s ability to deter Russia.
H2 argues that when an NA state lacking NATO membership engages in serious public
dialogue with NATO over membership, Russia is more likely to intervene in that state’s affairs. This
is preventive behavior intended to dissuade NATO from permitting the NA state’s accession.
Implicitly, the incentive to engage in this preventive behavior stems from an acknowledgment of the
potent deterrent effect created by NATO membership.68 NATO membership in turn derives its
strength from the Article V mutual defense pact. H2 therefore predicts that serious progress toward
membership between NATO and a non-member NA state creates an incentive for Russia to
intervene before the NA state can invoke the mandatory support of powerful NATO states.
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Although the Ukraine case study provides promising evidence for H2, Russian behavior
during the Orange Revolution does not fit neatly within the hypothesis’ predictions. The 1993
flashpoint is likely not relevant to this hypothesis because NATO and Ukraine had not yet
developed substantive relations by this point. Further, it is unclear whether the events surrounding
the 2004 Orange Revolution support the hypothesis. After establishing the cause for Russian anxiety
over this uprising, I examine arguments supporting and opposing the application of H2 in this case.
Not long after Ukraine gained its independence from the Soviet Union, it developed steady
cooperation with NATO by participating in several NATO peacekeeping initiatives in central
Europe and joining NATO partnership initiatives. Although this ultimately resulted in a relatively
close relationship between the two parties throughout the 1990s, the partnership had not progressed
to the point of serious membership talks.
The events of the early 2000s reduced the probability of Russian perception of Ukraine as
nearing NATO accession, so the Orange Revolution understandably alarmed Russian leaders. At
face value, Kuchma’s overtures toward NATO in 2002 and the creation in the same year of an
Action Plan to strengthen Ukraine’s relationship with the alliance hinted toward ambitions of
accession. Yet, these events were likely of little concern to Russian leaders. Ukraine’s
embargo-flouting sales of radar technology to Iraq, Kuchma’s unwelcome 2002 NATO summit
appearance and the U.S.’s disapproval of Kuchma’s conspicuous failure to promote democratic
processes all evidently remained thorns in the NATO-Ukraine relationship — and United States
apparently disclosed this reality directly to Kuchma.69 The lip service NATO paid to the partnership
at the time was hardly a cause for Russian apprehension. In the aftermath of these disputes, the
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Kremlin viewed the candidacy of Yanukovych in the 2004 election as a means for securing a
stronger bilateral relationship with Ukraine at the expense of Ukraine’s NATO membership
aspirations. It is no surprise, then, that the Orange Revolution surrounding the election disquieted
Russia.
On one level, the NATO-Ukraine disputes of the early 2000s and MAP plans of the later
2000s can explain the variation in intervention in a manner consistent with H2. The public tension
between Kuchma and NATO would have dispelled Russian concerns over recently improved
relations up to 2004. Furthermore, Ukraine remained distant from the conditions necessary for
NATO membership, as Kuchma proved unable to institute reforms laid out in the 2002 Action Plan.
Public opinion — a significant factor incorporated into NATO’s decisions to include new members
— also remained decidedly skeptical of joining NATO.70 Overall, the concrete progress toward
membership that had been achieved by 2004 was negligible, and, in line with H2, Russia did not
intervene. When Ukraine applied for MAPs in 2006 and 2008, Russian reactionary rhetoric signaled
the Kremlin’s deep displeasure. As the MAP program is an important early step in the NATO
accession process, Putin’s threats reflect Russia’s recognition that a successful MAP application
would constitute both a sign of progress and, correspondingly, a threat to Russian interests.
Yet, Ukraine’s MAP applications were rejected, and Yanukovych’s presidency, which began
with the new president’s officially shelving Ukrainian accession plans, effectively made the issue of
Ukraine’s relations with the West disappear until the controversy over the EU Association
Agreement ignited the 2013 Euromaidan protests. The fact that Russia did not intervene before the
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Ukrainian MAP applications and did intervene militarily after the MAP applications is a sequence
promising for H2.
An additional dimension reinforces the link between H2 and the timing of the interventions.
The hypothesis fits the timeline described above well, but the delay between the 2006-2008 MAP
applications and Russia’s early 2014 intervention should be considered. Another potential
explanation is that Ukraine’s gradual increase in efforts to secure a NATO MAP before
Yanukovych’s election, in the context of a general long-term trend of NATO expansion, created
conditions in which a triggering situation, even indirectly related to NATO, could spark Russian
intervention. This triggering event could take the form of Yanukovych’s removal, which could
appear as a de facto step away from a Russia-oriented policy and toward NATO membership, as
discussed above.
An explanation combining the long-term buildup of relations with NATO and the
immediate Euromaidan catalyst of an agreement with the EU may also account for Russia’s timing.
It is possible that Russian leaders viewed the Euromaidan protests — originally a response to
Yanukovych’s submission to Russian pressure and retraction of his commitment to enter the
landmark Association Agreement with the European Union — as a popular rejection of Russia and
turn toward the West. Further, it is possible that Russia considered both bodies in its calculations;
perhaps Russian leaders viewed heightened EU integration, especially in a post-Yanukovych
environment, as a harbinger of closer NATO ties. The widespread and violent protests pushing this
agenda would have only underscored this message. This interpretation could easily explain the time
gap between the MAP applications and the Russian intervention, since it would anticipate the

Rabin 41
immediate Russian reaction to Euromaidan while still allowing for Russian nonintervention in 2004
as previously examined.
H2 fits well with the discussion of the Ukrainian case, but the discrepancy between Russia’s
responses to the Orange Revolution and Euromaidan protests is notable. However, the
consideration of the impact of relevant triggering events like elections in combination with official
progress can help to partially — if not fully — explain the non-intervention in 2004 and
intervention in 2014. Later examination of the relationship between the respective implications of
H2 and H4 more fully resolves this discrepancy.

H3: Near abroad states are less likely to successfully deter Russia if Russia is able to use a covert method of attack.
H3 argues that if Russia is able to intervene in a covert manner, it is more likely to intervene
in an NA state’s affairs. By doing so, Russia can attempt to avoid the identification of its forces
altogether or, at minimum, achieve plausible deniability. This would allow it to continue to pursue its
goals while denying involvement through overt diplomatic channels, enabling it to secure tactical and
strategic gains while avoiding international punishment and military responses.
The Ukraine case study yields a mixed result for this hypothesis, and the connection remains
inconclusive. Russia has relied on two primary covert methods in Ukraine: covert conventional
forces and proxy forces. In its 2014 efforts to annex Crimea, Russia relied heavily on unidentified
soldiers — “little green men” — to secure key strategic points. Russia also supported separatist
groups during its campaign to force the splintering of eastern Ukrainian regions. However, although
Russia utilized both of these strategies in Ukraine, determining whether these options were viable
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for Russia at other points of time remains complicated. The discussion below will first examine
support for the hypothesis’ application and subsequently cover its challenges.
Russia’s heavy reliance upon covert conventional forces to make strategic gains in Crimea
implies their importance for Russia in its decision to intervene. At the 1993 flashpoint, Russian
officials openly encouraged a Crimean separatist movement, causing the leader of at least one group,
the Russian Society of Crimea, to advocate for armed rebellion against Ukraine. It is notable that
Russia did not intervene militarily at this point, although it did pursue political intervention. Thus,
while this does not support the idea that Russia is more likely to escalate its intervention if given the
chance by local separatists, Russia did try to use these separatists to cause political damage in
Ukraine. Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, Kuchma earned a reputation for silencing and
marginalizing Crimean separatism through legal and political processes.71 For Russia, this likely
would have ruled out stoking a Crimean separatist movement, and by extension, using covert forces
to propel the separatist movement at the time of the Orange Revolution.
Yet, Crimean separatists began to regain traction after Yanukovych became prime minister in
2006, as his party coalition depended on their support.72 This resurgence had tangible implications
for Ukraine and NATO, as these separatists prevented NATO from holding joint exercises on the
peninsula.73 Years later, the volatile atmosphere of the late 2013 Euromaidan protests convinced
Crimean official Vladimir Konstantinov to tell Russian security ministers that Crimea would seek a
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union with Russia if Yanukovych were removed from office.74 The Sevastopol City Council’s public
appeal to Crimeans to form self-defense squads indicates the tense atmosphere in which Russian
officials opted to use covert troops for intervention. Yanukovych’s removal after the upheaval of the
Euromaidan protests, as Konstantinov predicted, sparked fears among the Crimean public that its
interests might not be represented by the new administration, and the Ukrainian Rada’s late February
2014 vote to remove Russian as an official language in Ukraine provoked Crimean protests in
Crimea.75 Russia started to prepare for the deployment of its “little green men” on February 24,
three days after Yanukovych’s flight from Ukraine and one day after the Russian language vote,
indicating that the active disapproval of Crimeans likely contributed to the Russian decision to
intervene and annex Crimea.
This timing created an ideal pretext for the deployment of professional soldiers capable of
occupying strategic points, but the troops needed to appear local to deter any direct responses or
international action against Russia. By masquerading their soldiers as Crimean self-defense groups
— like those advocated by the Sevastopol council — Russia was also able to manufacture the
appearance of legitimacy and self-determination for the operation. For example, the Russian special
forces commandos who occupied the Crimean Parliament on February 27 claimed to be members
of a local Crimean defense group, while Russian intelligence operators worked for the next week to
construct defensive groups from local militias, Cossacks and former berkut riot policemen.76 These
latter groups apparently contributed little military help and were incorporated specifically to add a
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Crimean dimension to the occupying force.77 The Russian plan appears to have revolved around
maintaining the narrative that the Crimeans instigated the uprising and required Russian protection
to ensure their rights to self-determination. This suggests that the use of covert troops to
accomplish strategic goals while constructing a local image and integrating local structures into the
operation was an integral tool necessary for success. Russia’s deployment of “little green men” in
2014 therefore supports H3.
Russian collaboration with separatist entities in the ensuing 2014 Donbas conflict also
supports H3. While locating data on the specific pre-existing groups with which Russia collaborated
proves exceedingly difficult due to the reorganization of many separatists into standardized units,
Russia undeniably relied upon local proxies to pursue its goals in the Donbas region. By gradually
creating a separatist army of diverse actors infused with its own personnel, Russia relied heavily on a
proxy force. Local leaders were co-opted into recruiting local fighters as Russian volunteers and
veterans traveled to the region to support the separatist initiative. The vast majority of those
protesting the Ukrainian parliament’s move to revoke the official status of the Russian language were
local Ukrainians, and pro-Russian locals tried to occupy government buildings throughout eastern
Ukraine. This indicated a promising recruitment pool and likely contributed to Russian decisions to
pursue those means.78
Russia also took advantage of the patronage links of local elites, including Yanukovych, to
recruit new political leaders and fighters. Additionally, Ukrainian miners, volunteers and former
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Ukrainian riot policemen constituted significant portions of the separatist forces.79 However, specific
units appeared to be Russian-handled professionals tasked not only with performing well but also
with reining in the diverse groups constituting the separatist forces under Russian direction. Many of
these groups were majority Ukrainian manpower with an experienced core or leader with Russian
connections.80 The clear reliance upon separatist proxies suggests the importance of such actors in
the Russian decision to escalate its intervention to the kinetic realm, further supporting H3.
The two primary challenges for this case study’s support for H3 are accounting for the lack
of intense intervention in 1993 and confirming the absence of true proxies around the time of the
Orange Revolution. In 1993, the clear Russian willingness to stoke tensions in Crimea resulted not in
military intervention, which H3 claims is increasingly likely, but in political meddling and
encouragement of potentially violent separatist groups. Although there was no military action,
Russia’s aggressive political provocations seemed to result from the availability of potential separatist
splinter groups; the intervention just occurred at a lower intensity level than predicted.
While Russia’s covert invasion of Crimea in 2014 carried with it the implicit threat of further
and more intense military action, the option to deploy Russian troops covertly and masquerade them
as local defense units would have been available in 2004 as well. Russia’s military was far less
intimidating at the time, but it would likely have proved threatening enough to accomplish its
objective of bloodlessly returning Crimea to the Russian fold. Therefore, the opportunity for covert
action seems to have been available — if less viable — at multiple flashpoints. A more serious
challenge stems from the lack of information regarding the specific pre-existing separatist groups
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that were used to form Russia’s separatist army in addition to the groups formed after Euromaidan.
Many units of the separatist army appear to have been standardized in structure and name, making
identifying precursor groups difficult. Full information about which existing separatist groups
contributed to the army would allow further examination of the state of separatist militant groups
during the Orange Revolution. This would in turn permit a more decisive assessment of whether any
of the groups could have served as a viable proxy force for potential Russian intervention during the
Orange Revolution. Without this background, H3 lacks important information that could facilitate a
proper assessment of H3’s applicability at the Orange Revolution flashpoint.
Ultimately, the evidence supports H3, albeit in a limited manner. In its 2014 intervention in
Crimea, Russia relied upon the existence of active Crimean separatist sentiment to provide a cover
for its covert units, which were the central actors carrying out the annexation plan. It may have been
possible to use covert units at earlier points in time, but the relatively weak nature of Russia’s army,
coupled with the recent termination of direct Russian military involvement in the Second Chechen
War, greatly reduced the plausibility of these forces’ deployment. The subsequent Donbas case
shows that Russia relied immensely on proxy forces at the onset of the conflict.
Although additional information regarding the specific separatist groups included in the
separatist army would greatly strengthen the body of evidence for this incident, the fact that Russia
perceived the opportunity to construct proxy forces from locals and by capitalizing upon local
power structures provides sufficient support for the theory. This mirrors the Russian behavior of the
early 1990s, when governmental bodies and officials attempted to stoke a Crimean separatist
movement, although this flashpoint provides largely minor support. The evidence in both 2014
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scenarios implies the centrality of both covert and proxy forces to the Russians’ plan, which
ultimately suggests that Russia is more likely to intervene if it identifies such forces.

H4: The extent of Russian intervention in the affairs of near abroad states reflects the strength of the Russian
economic strategic position.
H4 suggests that Russia is more inclined to intervene in near abroad states’ affairs if Russia
possesses a favorable economic position. Several economic metrics are examined at the point of
Russian military intervention — 2014 — and at both 1993 and 2004, points of Russian
nonintervention. Ultimately, the Ukraine case study offers solid support for H4.
Examination of Russian gross domestic product (GDP) growth provides a useful indicator
in support of H4, while a comparison with that of the U.S. adds an additional informative
dimension. From 1990 to 1994, Russian GDP decreased by a substantial average rate of -8.76%,
while U.S. GDP increased steadily and averaged a 2.23% growth rate over the same period.81 This
aligns well with Russian nonintervention at the 1993 flashpoint. In the lead-up to the 2004 Orange
Revolution flashpoint, from 2000 to 2004, Russia averaged 6.07% growth. Yet, it should be noted
that the Russian economy at this point was still much smaller than it had been at the start of the
1990s, due to that decade’s recession. At this time, the U.S. economy was continuing its long trend of
growth at a steady 2.41% rate.82 While the Russian growth rate during this time was more drastic
than that of the U.S., which clashes with Russian nonintervention at this flashpoint, the Russian
economy was still markedly smaller than it had been ten years before, while the U.S.’ economy had
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grown over a long period of time to a size it had never before achieved. The average relative growth
rate would suggest Russian intervention at this point, but broader consideration of long-term trends
in each economy and evaluation of each country’s capacity suggests nonintervention.
Leading up to the 2014 flashpoint, Russian GDP was still rising, but its rate was declining
steadily into the rates of 3.7 percent in 2012 and 1.8 percent in 2013. 2013 marked, by far, the largest
size of the Russian economy ever. Over the same period, the U.S. economy continued to experience
a painfully slow recovery from the 2008 financial crisis as U.S. GDP growth declined from 2.25 to
1.84. This vein of examination supports H4 because Russian intervention and nonintervention
patterns clearly follow a trend of Russian economic capacity, and this trend dovetails with the
evolution of comparative economic strength between the economies of Russia and the U.S. Russia
was unwilling to intervene in 1993 when its economy was in freefall and in 2004 when its recent
growth was just overcoming the damage caused by the recent recession. However, when an
opportunity to intervene in Ukrainian affairs emerged in 2014, after the economy had long since
recovered, intervention occurred. This pattern clearly supports H4.
An examination of trade dynamics between Russia and Ukraine at the three points of interest
can provide further insight. At the 1993 flashpoint, Russia and Ukraine were engaged in positive
trade discussions, and they reached a free trade agreement in June 1993, suggesting intentions to
strengthen the bilateral economic relationship.83 Although a series of trade disputes emerged
between the countries from 2000 to 2002, bilateral trade exchange grew substantially after this point.
Exchange was particularly high before the 2004 elections and Orange Revolution.84 Poor trade
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relations, however, directly caused the 2014 Euromaidan protests. As Ukraine pursued the signing of
an Associated Agreement with the European Union, Russia increased pressure on Yanukovych to
forsake this plan and instead pursue further economic integration with Russia.
In response, Putin applied punishment and then offered incentives. In August 2013, Russia
blocked all Ukrainian imports from entering Russia, shocking the Ukrainian economy.85 As protests
erupted around Yanukovych’s failure to pursue the Association Agreement, Putin offered to slash
the price of Russian gas by one third and buy billions of Ukrainian bonds.86 Yet, the arrangement
crumbled and Russia retained its superior trade position as the Ukrainian economy slid into
recession. Russia began its annexation of Crimea mere months afterward. Again, in a manner similar
to the growth comparison between the two countries, trade patterns offer insights into the timing of
Russian intervention. Russia refrained from intervention when strong trade links existed between the
two countries. Yet, as the two countries reached a critical point in their relationship and Ukraine
attempted to integrate more closely with the European Union, Russia behaved aggressively, first
enacting harsh punitive measures and then offering concessions before eventually invading.
The Ukraine case study offers support for H4. Russia avoided intervention when its
economy fared poorly, but it intervened when its economy had recovered, even with a slower growth
rate. Sensitivity to its relative weakness compared to the U.S. economy in the 1990s and 2004 is
apparent, while its intervention occurred at a point of comparative strength. The second metric of
analyzing trade relations at each flashpoint complements this conclusion. When trade relations were
growing, Russia refrained from escalating, but when Russia was in a position to exercise its
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significant economic leverage over Ukraine — especially with a Ukraine-EU agreement at stake —
Russia intervened militarily.

Hypothesis conclusions
Overall, the hypotheses fared well, although they did not provide answers for all questions.
The case study supported H1 because it depicted Russia’s willingness to intervene in the affairs of a
non-NATO state. However, H1 did not conclusively explain dependent variable variation within the
case. The case study supported H2 fairly well, although the time gap between the last major
pro-NATO steps and Russian intervention remains a matter of note. However, consideration of
additional factors provided a more robust perspective that supported the hypothesis. H3 was
generally supported, but more specific information regarding specific groups is required to provide
conclusive support. H4 fared extremely well and provided valuable insights.
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Georgia: Historical Overview

87

The Georgia case study provides further support for the paper’s central argument in the
context of Russian intervention against a non-NATO NA state. Flashpoints for potential Russian
intervention occurred in the early 1990s, 2003, 2004 and 2008. As in the Ukraine case, the Georgia
case supports the paper’s central argument, indicating both Russian unwillingness to intervene at
high intensity against a non-NATO NA state pursuing membership during a period of economic
weakness and willingness to do so after economic stabilization of the Russian economy. A
description of relevant historical events throughout the relationships between Georgia, the separatist
republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the Russian Federation and NATO will more easily
facilitate discussion of the hypotheses.
Despite ethnic distinctions, the regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia have both frequently
been grouped together politically with Georgia throughout history, often resulting in conflict. Both

87

“Map of Georgia, Abkhazia, South Osetia.” Wikimedia Commons, July 5, 2011.

Rabin 52
regions belonged to Georgia during its brief post-Russian Empire independence from 1918 to 1922,
but South Ossetia engaged in an unsuccessful civil war against Georgia for several years.88 During
the USSR’s administration, Abkhazia and South Ossetia generally remained autonomous republics
within the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic. After Georgia split from the crumbling Soviet Union
in 1991, the two territories again waged costly civil wars in attempts to win independence from
Georgia.89 The Abhazians, notably, received support from some Russian military units. The Russian
leadership was divided on the matter of the war, creating subsequent confusion about whether
Russian leaders were responsible for this limited military support. Russian President Boris Yeltsin
often vocalized his support for Georgian territorial integrity. At the same time, the
Communist-dominated parliament tried to support the Abkhaz forces as a coercive tool to push
Georgia into the CIS and to retailate against support that the Russians alleged Georgia was giving to
Chechnyan rebels.90
Yeltsin claimed Russian soldiers’ involvement was simply a result of individual local
commanders’ agendas, but Georgian President Eduard Shevarnadze alleged Russian central
leadership organized or blessed Abkhazian attacks.91 Circumstantial evidence indicates that Yeltsin
would occasionally “bend, if not bow” to pressure from the Parliament; yet, this effort did not
appear centrally coordinated as an official state operation.92 Abkhazia essentially defeated Georgian
troops, forcing Georgia to enter Russia’s CIS and subsequently request CIS peacekeepers to protect

Markovic, Nina. “Behind the Scenes of the Russia-Georgia Conflict.” Parliament of Australia,
February 18, 2013.
89
Ibid.
90
Kozhokin, Evgeny. “Chapter 5: Georgia-Abkhazia.” In U.S. and Russian Policymaking With Respect to
the Use of Force. RAND Corporation, 1996.
91
Ibid.
92
Ibid.
88

Rabin 53
the Abkhazia-Georgia border. Although both republics declared independence and are often
considered de facto autonomous, their claims remained unrecognized internationally until Russia
took up their case in 2008.
Georgia entered relations with NATO in the early 1990s. The country joined NATO’s North
Atlantic Cooperation Council/Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council in 1992 and entered the PFP in
1994. Georgian forces supported NATO’s Kosovo mission in 1999, which likely irked Russia, an ally
of Serbia that protested against the NATO mission. Georgia opened joint exercises with NATO in
2001 and 2002.93 The possible NATO accession of Georgia, a former member of the USSR,
evidently stirred Russian apprehensions in the late 2000s.
Relations between Georgia and Russia remained volatile throughout the late 1990s and early
2000s, as Russia accused Georgia of aiding and training Chechnyan rebels. Georgia denied these
allegations and summoned Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) monitors
for verification. Yet, in mid-2000, Russian planes struck Georgian guard posts and towns three times,
claiming that one of the incidents was accidental.94 At this point, acknowledging and addressing the
issue of a potential Chechen rebel presence in Georgia allowed both states to strengthen their
positions in the region. Russia could claim justification for limited strikes against its neighbor,
Georgia could request international funding, and the United States could expand on its regional
footprint by providing personnel to aid Georgia.95
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Yet, the events of the 2003 Rose Revolution would prove to have a far greater impact upon
the relationship between Georgia, Russia and NATO. After Putin became Russian president in 2000,
he maintained an amicable tone toward NATO for several years. The Rose Revolution occurred
during this stage of that relationship.96 After Georgia’s population began to suspect electoral fraud in
the 2003 presidential election, nearly 100,000 peaceful protesters blocked the streets of Tbilisi, the
Georgian capital, and demanded the resignation of Shevardnadze, who had been in power since a
coup early in the days of Georgian independence. When the president sent several hundred armed
soldiers to restore order in the streets, the protesters handed roses to the soldiers and proceeded to
storm the parliament building. Mikhail Saakashvili personally requested Shevardnadze’s resignation
in the chamber and won the presidential election several months later.97
Russo-Georgian relations soured directly after the revolution, as Russia considered the
events a coup, and Saakashvili’s preference to create a stronger relationship with the West put him at
odds with the Kremlin.98 Although the U.S. had supported Shevardnadze, Saakashvili’s term marked
a distinct turn toward NATO and the West, and achieving NATO membership dominated his
foreign policy after he entered office.99 He openly expressed aspirations for Georgian NATO
membership, but he also attempted to implement serious policy reforms to expedite the process.100
Georgian soldiers contributed to efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq throughout the mid-2000s, and
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between 2004 and 2007, Saakashvili increased Georgia’s military expenditure from 1.37 percent of
GDP to 9.1 percent.101 These efforts to strengthen ties with NATO, however, would prove
ineffective when battle-tested.
The 2004 Adjara crisis represents an intriguing and anomalous point of Russian aid — rather
than intervention — in Georgia’s attempts to pacify its separatist republics. Adjara, another
autonomous region of Georgia controlled by a Russia-friendly ex-Soviet leader, Aslan Abashidze,
presented a crisis immediately after Saakashvili’s rise to power. Adjara was an independent republic
in the USSR but emerged as technically part of the Georgian state. Saakashvili’s overt determination
to bring Adjara fully under Georgian control fed tensions before a parliamentary election, as
pro-Saakashvili political campaigns spouted anti-Abashidze rhetoric.
The uneasy situation devolved into violence in February 2004 as supporters of both sides
clashed and individuals linked to Adjara’s security ministry beat a prominent Georgian journalist.102
Abashidze protested that the Georgian government was attempting to foment a Rose Revolution in
Adjara. In March, he traveled to Moscow in an attempt to secure Russian backing, as a remaining
Russian military base in Adjara ensured Russia’s deep interest in the region’s security. Tensions
increased when Georgian forces were put on high alert as approximately 1,000 Adjarian paramilitary
and special forces personnel coalesced near the territory’s border.103 The crisis reached its apex after
separatists destroyed major bridges linking the region to Georgia and thousands of protesters
marched against Abashidze in a manner reminiscent of the Rose Revolution. Georgian officials’
remarks at this time alluded ominously to the violent death of former Romanian dictator Nicolae
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Ceaușescu. Eventually, a Russian envoy convinced Abashidze to abdicate his position and flee to
Russia, with safe passage guaranteed by Georgia. The Russian decision to use the country’s influence
to facilitate a peaceful resolution of the crisis, rather than to support the Russia-friendly leader who
supported the Adjara Russian military base, led to hopes for a more productive Georgia-Russia
relationship and future collaboration in the peaceful resolution of Georgia’s separatist crises.104
This initial thawing of their bilateral relationship quickly devolved as conflict arose in South
Ossetia in May 2004. Directly after the successful diffusion of the Adjara crisis, Saakashvili ordered
the destruction of a lucrative smuggling enterprise lining the pockets of South Ossetian President
Eduard Kokoity. Georgian forces closed a major smuggling market by force and bombed roads.105 In
July, Georgian peacekeepers discovered and detained a Russian peacekeeper convoy apparently
bringing arms to South Ossetia, driving up tensions between Georgia and Russia.106 In early August,
the Russian Duma labeled Georgian warnings to South Ossetians as violations of Russian
sovereignty, warned of an impending large-scale conflict involving Russia and asked Putin to take
action for the sake of stability.107 Clashes between Georgian and South Ossetian forces soon erupted,
but a ceasefire was established in August.108 Yet, a Georgian Defense and Security committee
parliamentarian alleged that video evidence proved Russian troops were preparing to attack
Georgian targets until Saakashvili opted to recall Georgian units from South Ossetia.109
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Despite Saakashvili’s subsequent offers of autonomy for South Ossetia, relations worsened
and further incidents continued to sour relations between Georgia, South Ossetia and Russia. A
2005 Georgian proposal to grant South Ossetia additional autonomy as a constituent of Georgia
failed to attract Ossetian backing, despite cautious Russian approval. Although this plan entailed a
Georgian compromise by offering further autonomy, it also required a compromise from the
Ossetians — recognition of direct Georgian control. Instead, Ossetians later voted for complete
independence in an unrecognized referendum.110 Trilateral tensions flared in 2006 after Georgia
arrested several Russian military officers it claimed were spies who planned a deadly car bombing
and Russia restricted its levels of Georgian exports.111 In 2007, a Georgian parliamentary move to
establish a temporary Georgian administration in South Ossetia again inflamed relations with Russia.
112

That August, a missile fired from a Sukhoi jet landed without detonating near a Georgian village.

Georgia, citing radar records, alleged that the jet was Russian, while the Russians denied the claim
and accused Georgia of planting the missile.113 A month later, Georgia claimed it shot down a plane
that had repeatedly entered its airspace from Russia, while Russia and Abkhazia claimed the plane
was a Georgian plane that crashed independently.114
In 2008, NATO activity pushed Russian-Georgian tensions to the breaking point. At the
April 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest, American advocacy for the creation of Georgian and
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Ukrainian MAP plans was overruled by European concerns over Russian reactions. The decision to
grant a MAP was based on whether NATO members considered that country’s progress within the
1994 PFP program adequate.115 Despite the decision to refrain from granting MAPs, NATO
committed to granting both countries membership in the future and guaranteed consideration of the
matter at the December 2008 summit.116 Russia reacted harshly. The Russian chief of staff vowed
that Russia would take military and non-military measures to protect its regional interests, and the
Russian foreign minister declared that Russia would undertake any necessary steps for preventing
Georgian and Ukraininan membership.117
The next events led to conflict between Georgia and Russia. In mid-April, Putin ordered the
official recognition of businesses in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, created formal diplomatic
connections and transferred additional military forces and equipment to Abkhazia.118 Russia and
Abkhazia then accused Georgia of massing troops near the Abkhaz border, although United
Nations observers stated that they did not possess evidence of this.119Afterward, a plane later
confirmed by UN observers to be Russian shot down a Georgian unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)
over Abkhazia. After buses transporting Georgian voters during a parliamentary election were blown
up — a move that UN observers suggested may have been staged by Georgia — Russia deployed
troops to rebuild a railway connecting Abkhazia and Russia and began a large-scale military exercise
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near its border.120 Two days after the railway was mended, a Georgian police vehicle was attacked
with improvised explosive devices that the US ambassador to Georgia privately attributed to Russia,
and shooting and shelling broke out between Georgian and South Ossetian forces.121 Although
attribution remains murky, an independent EU observer alleges Georgian instigation of the
firefights.122
Within the week, a convoy of 100 Russian vehicles entered the tunnel linking Russian
territory with South Ossetia. Georgian troops then shelled the South Ossetian capital Tskhinvali and
occupied the city, but Russian troops launched a successful counterattack.123 At this time, Russia also
launched crippling cyberattacks against Georgian websites. Russian planes bombed strategic targets
inside Georgian borders, including factories in the Georgian capital Tbilisi and civilian residences in
Gori, while Russian troops pushed into South Ossetia and opened a new front in Abkhazia.124 The
Russians pushed far into Georgian territory before a ceasefire agreement was reached with
international moderation. Russia then officially recognized the two separatist republics as
independent states, despite Western criticism. Russian soldiers remained stationed in the separatist
enclaves.125
Despite periods of improved diplomatic relations since the war, tensions remain. The war
took its toll on Saakashvili’s popularity, and after his 2012 electoral loss, Georgia’s government
managed to gradually improve relations with Russia. Tourist visa permissions for Russians opened in
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2012, providing prospects of economic growth in the crucial tourism sector.126 Late that year,
bilateral diplomatic discussions reopened for the first time since the war, and in 2013, Russia eased
its restrictions on Georgian goods. Yet, despite this progress, the separatist republics have remained
sticking points. In 2017, Russia moved to incorporate South Ossetian military structures into its
own, formalizing Russian command and control.127 Tensions flared again in 2019 when Georgian
crowds protested violently after a Russian politician gave a speech from the speaker’s chair of the
Georgian parliament. Although Putin rejected the Duma’s motion to enact retaliatory sanctions, the
Kremlin criticized Georgia’s inability to “pacify anti-Russian forces.”128
Throughout this period, multiple opportunities existed for Russia to intervene militarily in
Georgian affairs. The 2008 Russo-Georgian War and, to a limited degree, the small-scale Russian
backing of separatists in the early 1990s, are instances in which Russia opted to intervene, while the
2003 Rose Revolution and 2004 Ajara crisis represent notable points at which this did not occur.
This thesis questions why the Russian propensity for intervention varied across the different
flashpoints in this case.
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Georgia: Hypothesis Analysis
H1: Near abroad states with NATO membership are more likely to successfully achieve general deterrence toward
Russia.
H1 posits that NA states that have attained NATO membership are more likely to deter
Russia from initiating and escalating interventions. In the case of Georgia, the independent variable
— Georgia’s status as a NATO member or non-member — has remained static. Despite Georgia’s
efforts in the mid-2000s, it has not yet received NATO membership. Georgia’s case therefore adds
to the body of evidence for Russia’s willingness to intervene against non-NATO member NA states.
Russia acted militarily against Georgia when it launched overt attacks against Georgia in the 2008
Russo-Georgian War. Furthermore, some Russian units supported separatists against Georgia during
the conflicts of the early 1990s; this involvement does not appear to have been centrally organized,
but the leadership may have turned a blind eye to this minor military support. This pattern of
interference against a non-NATO state supports H1. However, at first glance, the lack of Russian
escalation in response to the 2003 Rose Revolution and the decision to aid Georgia during the 2004
Adjara crisis, rather than undermine it by supporting the rebellious territory, warrant explanation in
the context of the hypothesis.
Russia’s decisions to intervene in both low-level and overt military manners in Georgian
affairs at several key junctures demonstrate its leaders’ comfort with applying Russian military power
against non-NATO former USSR members. This can be seen in Russia’s willingness to both support
separatist entities within Georgia and unilaterally attack targets in undisputed Georgian territory. As
Abkhazia and South Ossetia waged separatist wars against Georgia in the 1990s, Russian planes and
ground units assisted the rebels. Yeltsin often claimed that these strikes were results of wayward

Rabin 62
commanders, but such repeated instances likely indicated that Yeltsin may have turned a blind eye to
the military’s actions. Russia’s subsequent decisions to launch strikes against Georgian forces in the
separatist territories during the 2008 crisis and to escalate the conflict by attacking targets within
undisputed zones in Georgia — including strategic targets like warplane factories near Tbilisi —
reveal its comfort with escalating conflicts against weaker non-NATO member NA states.
Given this demonstrated Russian risk-acceptance vis-a-vis Georgia, the Rose Revolution and
Adjara crisis at face value appear to be slightly surprising points of non-intervention at a basic level;
however, closer examination of each situation highlights factors that could have reasonably reduced
the probability of Russian intervention. The Rose Revolution represented the popular overthrow of
a sitting president and former Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs by a staunchly pro-Western leader.
Russia has historically criticized this kind of political revolution in its region and has often accused
the West of supporting such revolutionary factions.
Yet, Shevarnadze was also viewed as an ally of the West and a thorn in Russia’s side. His
former tenure as the Soviet foreign minister also earned him little love among Russians, as he was
perceived to have played a role in the dissolution of the Soviet Union.129 Russia aided in negotiations
between Shevarnadze and the opposition, likely because it saw an opportunity to nurture closer
relations with Georgia at the onset of the new Georgian president’s term. Russia mostly hardened its
rhetoric regarding the revolution and blamed the West after opposition parties in Moldova,
encouraged by the Rose Revolution, staged protests that forced the Moldovan president to back out
of a diplomatic deal with Russia.130
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This behavior implies that Russia was initially inclined to view the change of leadership
optimistically, especially given its difficult history with Shevarnadze. Russia seemed to bristle
primarily after the revolution and subsequent presidential turnover directly impacted its diplomatic
initiatives in its near abroad. This observation pairs well with Russia’s response after the Euromaidan
protests in Ukraine removed a leader who had yielded to Russian pressure and dropped a deal with
the EU in favor of closer economic ties with Russia.
The lack of Russian intervention in the 2004 Adjara crisis was also likely a product of this
early period of cooperation between Putin and Saakashvili, as well as a consequence of other factors.
Putin’s willingness to actually ameliorate the crisis and broker a peaceful resolution indicates the
optimistic attitude Putin took toward this aspect of Russia-Georgia relations at the time. It is also
noteworthy that anti-Russian protests occurred in Adjara throughout the crisis and the vast majority
of the Adjarian population is ethnically Georgian, meaning Russia’s long-term interest in helping
Adjara to achieve independence is limited.131 Adjara, unlike Abkhazia and South Ossetia, does not
border Russia. Even if Russia could weaken Georgia by forcing Adjara’s secession, Adjara presents a
much less likely candidate for possible incorporation into the Russian Federation than the other two
separatist republics, reducing the value of supporting chaos in Adjara.
Overall, Russia’s willingness to intervene with its conventional military at multiple points
throughout its relationship with Georgia indicates a significant lack of Georgian deterrent capability
as a non-NATO member NA state.
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H1A: The United States’ credibility positively affects near abroad states’ abilities to deter Russia.
H1A contends that the U.S.’s credibility as a capable actor willing to intervene militarily
abroad factors into Russian calculations for intervention in NA states. The Georgia case study
provides solid support for this hypothesis.
U.S. capability and credibility in the early 1990s was at an exceptionally high point. The U.S.
had emerged victorious from the Cold War as the leading power in a unipolar world, at the price of
the Soviet Union’s fall from bipolar heavyweight to a significantly weaker state in the Russian
Federation. The U.S. also proved its conventional superiority during the 1990 Desert Shield and 1991
Desert Storm operations. Russia did support separatist forces in their conflicts against Georgia, but
this support remained limited, and the degree of consensus between the Russian parliament and
Yeltsin in authorizing this support is unclear. Therefore, while low-level Russian intervention during
this period did occur, its highly limited nature is significant to the hypothesis. Leading up to the 2003
and 2004 flashpoints, at which Russian intervention did not occur, U.S. credibility again was solid.
The U.S. invasions of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003 underscored both the U.S. willingness to
intervene across the world and the capability of doing so. This corresponds with Russian
nonintervention at this point.
Yet, by 2008, U.S. credibility had decreased due to poor progress in these wars. The mere fact
of the U.S.’s continued deep engagement in these conflicts inherently reduced the chances of the U.S.
opening a new major conflict by responding militarily to Russian actions in Georgia. The U.S. had
just committed more resources and personnel to the fight in Iraq in 2007, a move that not only
increased U.S. involvement but resulted in the most annual casualties among U.S. soldiers during the
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conflict until that point.132 By 2008, U.S. public opinion had shifted drastically against the War in
Iraq, with 54% disapproval and 38% approval as opposed to 22% disapproval and 72% approval in
2003.133 It should be noted that Russia’s 2008 intervention occurred before the onset of the global
financial crisis of 2008, so this economic distress was not a salient factor in the Russian intervention
calculus. These circumstances align well with the Russian decision to act militarily against Georgia in
2008.
Overall, trends of U.S. credibility correspond well with patterns of Russian intervention and
nonintervention in Georgian affairs. The Russian active support of the separatists in the early 1990s
does pose an issue for the hypothesis, but it is important to note both the questionable centrality of
this decision and the limited nature of the intervention. Russian nonintervention in 2003 and 2004
matches the high degree of U.S. credibility at this time, while intervention in 2008 as the U.S.
remained entrenched in costly and increasingly unpopular conflicts also supports the hypothesis.

H2: Overt NATO deliberations surrounding an NA state’s possible entry without officially giving membership
decrease that state’s ability to deter Russia.
H2 argues that an NA state engaging in overt constructive dialogue with NATO regarding
membership or openly making progress in NATO programs intended to groom for membership has
a lesser likelihood of deterring Russian intervention. The Georgian case study provides solid support
for H2, although, as in the discussion of H1, non-intervention in the cases of the Rose Revolution
and the Adjara crisis must be examined.
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The major flashpoint at which Russian behavior supports H2 is Russian intervention in
2008. The uncanny timing of Russia’s decision to intervene actively in Georgian relations with the
separatists suggests a strong connection between NATO activity and Russian military actions.
Although NATO did not offer Georgia a MAP plan at its 2008 Bucharest summit — a decision
NATO members guided by prescient concerns that Russia would respond in a violent or
destabilizing manner — it suggested to Georgia that it would eventually receive membership and
committed to taking up the matter as soon as that December. Russia’s civil and military leaders
responded openly to these NATO promises by threatening military and non-military actions to
protect Russian national interests.
Within weeks, Russia escalated tensions by opting out of the CIS economic sanctions on
Abkhazian and Ossetian businesses, shooting a Georgian drone and potentially blowing up a
Georgian police vehicle, although the Russians argued the Georgians blew up the vehicle to blame
the attack on the Ossetians and trigger a conflict. It also mobilized its military and prepared for a
military incursion into the separatist territories before the outbreak of conflict. When Georgian
troops entered South Ossetia, Russia’s military response was massive and swift. Russia’s deliberate
opening of a second front in Abkhazia and subsequent invasion of Georgia indicate a political
objective revolving around Georgia, rather than the simple intention to defend Ossetians and
stabilize the region. It is evident that within weeks of NATO’s promises, Russia intentionally
escalated tensions between Georgia and the separatists and capitalized upon the opportunity to
invade Georgia. These actions fall in line with the Kremlin and Russian military’s blunt promises to
assert Russian interests through military and non-military means.
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Some might argue that NATO’s MAP promises might not have been the immediate trigger
for Russian intervention but rather were preemptive deterrent responses to a perceived immediate
threat of Russian intervention against Georgia. According to this logic, if the MAP was discussed for
the sole purpose of preventing an imminent Russian intervention, the Russian intervention could
not technically be considered a response to the stimulus of the MAP comments. Yet, this
assumption is flawed. NATO grants its MAP programs to countries with which it has developed
long-standing and productive relationships. Its members assess whether the aspirant country has
progressed far enough in military and political reforms previously established as necessary for
NATO accession. Saakashvili consistently supported Georgian military reforms for years before
tensions with Russia reemerged, and these efforts resulted in a steadily increased percentage of
Georgian GDP dedicated to military reformation after 2004. NATO’s consideration of Georgian
MAP requests in 2008 occurred at a reasonable period of time given Georgian efforts. Such
concerns of reversed causality between Russian intervention and NATO’s guarantees are therefore
unfounded.
The flashpoint of Russian intervention in the early 1990s, although it might constitute
Russian military intervention against Georgia on behalf of separatist territories, is not necessarily
relevant to H2. Georgian relations with NATO at that point in time were largely undeveloped, and
the minimal Russian military support for Abkhazia and South Ossetia appears more closely linked to
disputes with Shevarnadze, allegations of Georgian support for Chechnyan separatists and direct
concerns over the orientation of the separatist territories than with NATO and Georgia. While
forcing Georgia into a position in which it would feel forced to join the CIS certainly played a large
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role in this decision, there is little evidence that this was directed in response to specific
developments in NATO-Georgia relations. In this conflict, NATO did not play a central role.
In a vein similar to the discussion of H1, the Rose Revolution presented a complicated
situation for Russia that did not initially represent an obvious Georgian step closer to NATO.
Although Saakashvili was considered pro-Western and many of the NGOs involved in Shevarnadze’s
removal were backed with Western money, this change did not inherently imply a shift toward
NATO. Shevarnadze was friendly toward NATO and only the previous year had allowed American
advisors into Georgian territory for counterterrorism training.134 Saakashvili’s rise, although
problematic for Russia, initially may have also presented an opportunity to develop closer relations
with a new leader. Russia’s position toward Saakashvili had not yet soured to a point of concern.
Russian non-intervention in the Adjara crisis follows this logic. Georgia had not yet pivoted
toward NATO to a degree that would stoke Russian aggression. Relations with Saakashvili and
Georgia were still trending up as Saakashvili and Putin worked constructively during this period. In
the context of this cooperative period, Russia aided Georgia in diffusing the Adjara crisis, rather than
standing by or aiding it. Furthermore, as noted in the discussion of H1, demographic and
geographic factors make Adjara an unlikely candidate for incorporation into Russia, lessening the
appeal of assisting its separatism. Non-intervention in this case follows logically.
Overall, this case supports H2 when considering formal steps in the process leading to
Georgian NATO accession. Russia’s rhetoric and reaction to NATO’s strong suggestions of a
Georgian MAP reflect this causality. Georgia’s relationship with NATO had not yet progressed to a
point Russia considered threatening, so the Rose Revolution did not trigger intervention.
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H3: Near abroad states are less likely to successfully deter Russia if Russia is able to use a covert method of attack.
H3 identifies the ability to use a covert method of attack or the availability of plausible proxy
forces as causal factors in Russian intervention. The Georgian case study provides a sizable body of
evidence to support H3. In this case, the availability of willing proxy forces seems to be a greater
factor, as proxies were closely linked to Russia’s immediate strategic goals. However, Russia did
evidently take opportunities for covert action in conjunction with its support of proxy armies. As in
the discussions of H1 and H2, non-intervention during the 2004 Adjara crisis warrants examination.
Both instances of Russian intervention support H3. As Georgia struggled to fight against
separatists in South Ossetia and Abkhazia in the early 1990s, Russia backed the separatists militarily
both through arms aid and actual deployment of Russian units. Yet, it seems that Russia effectively
secured a degree of plausible deniability through the presence of its proxies, as the separatists could
act with low-visibility Russian backing and Yeltsin could claim at various points that Russian
commanders were acting independently, separating the central Russian government from Russian
military actions. Russia was therefore able to pursue its strategic, operational and tactical goals with
both proxies and conventional forces for which it could deny responsibility. Russian interest in using
proxies and pursuing covert action is also visible in its behavior during the tense buildup to the 2008
crisis. The confirmed Russian jet strike against a Georgian drone and alleged Russian role in the
police car bombing suggest a Russian interest in engaging in covert brinkmanship at this point.
Clearly, the existence of strong and feasible proxies in Abkhazia and South Ossetia encouraged overt
Russian intervention in 2008. In this case, the Russian-backed separatist troops seemed to almost
play the role of trigger forces, as Russia launched a well-prepared and large-scale military response
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immediately after the separatists engaged in combat. This willingness to launch an attack due to the
availability of proxies is precisely the behavior predicted by H3.
It is true that these proxies have been constantly available to Russia; therefore, one might
argue that since the independent variable remains the same throughout the case study, Russian
intervention in this case cannot be attributed to the availability of proxies. Yet, it is not variation of
proxies’ availability in this case that supports H3. Rather, it is notable that Russia exhibited comfort
intervening with its proxies at numerous points in response to other stimuli besides an increasing
availability of proxies. Their availability has allowed Russia to intervene easily and constantly when it
desires to do so. Essentially, the relatively high level and frequency of intervention in this case
reflects the steady availability of proxy actors.
The Adjara crisis may at first seem an appropriate opportunity for intervention given the
availability of local proxies, but additional factors render these less viable options than the separatists
in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Unlike Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Adjara is completely separated
from the Russian border by Georgian territory. This creates additional barriers to supplying arms
and maintaining a consistent flow of materials. In addition to Adjara’s geographic position, the
territory’s majority ethnic Georgian population may also make the Adjarians less desirable proxy
partners for Russia due to the impossibility of eventually incorporating the territory into Russia.
Yet, one of the most salient reasons Russia chose to aid Georgia in this case is that the crisis
occurred in the broader political context of a positive bilateral relationship. H3 does not suppose
blindly that Russia will intervene in every scenario in which a separatist group presents a potential
proxy force; it only assumes that Russia will have a lower threshold for intervening in such
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environments when intervention is in Russian political interests. This crisis did not occur at such a
point.
The Georgian case study broadly supports H3, as the availability of South Ossetian and
Abkhazian separatist forces — and the long-term political relationships Russia formed with these
entities — enabled Russian intervention at numerous points.

H4: The extent of Russian intervention in the affairs of near abroad states reflects the strength of the Russian
economic strategic position.
H4 argues that if Russia is performing well economically, holds a stronger economic position
relative to the West or holds strategic economic leverage over the NA state in question, it is more
likely to intervene.
Russia’s economy performed poorly in comparison to that of the U.S. in the early 1990s. As
the U.S.’s GDP continued a trend of steady expansion and averaged 2.23% growth from 1990 to
1994, the Russian economy shrank.135 Russian GDP averaged a loss of -8.76% over that same
period.136 Notably, this is a time when Russia was apparently providing light military support to the
separatists fighting Georgia. At this point, this contrast in economic performance would have
predicted non-intervention.
At the 2003 and 2004 flashpoints, the Russian economy was performing extremely well and
recovering from the late 1990s’ crash. Russian GDP averaged growth of 6.07% from 2000 to 2004,
although the economy was still small compared to its size a decade beforehand.137 During this same
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period, the U.S. was continuing a longstanding trend of slow and steady growth, averaging 2.41%
growth from 2000 to 2004.138 While a comparison of short-term economic performance favors
Russian growth rates over those of the U.S., it is important to note that Russian non-intervention in
2003 and assistance in 2004 occurred at a time when Russia’s economy was just approaching its
previous size, and the U.S. economy had never been larger. The relative rates do not support H4
regarding the 2003 and 2004 flashpoints, but the overall balance of capability does.
By the 2008 flashpoint, Russia’s economy was still growing rapidly while the U.S.’s growth
was slowing and approaching stagnation. Russia’s economy averaged 7.05% growth from 2005 to
2008 and far surpassed the Russian economy’s highest point before the late 1990s’ default.139 Over
the same period, the U.S. economy averaged 2.02% growth, but its growth rate was decreasing
before the economic crisis.140 This comparison of economic performance does not immediately
suggest intervention, although the basic balance of growth rates indeed favors Russia here. The
success in absolute terms of Russia’s economy relative to its previous state is particularly notable.
Georgia’s geographic position leaves it particularly vulnerable to Russian economic pressure.
Russia has historically been Georgia’s main gas provider, and it exploited this to increase prices
steeply for Georgia after the Rose Revolution.141 Although Georgia began to purchase gas from
Azerbaijan in 2008, Russia was still able to exploit its power grid links in Georgia through utilizing
pre-existing connections and buying Georgian companies.142 These factors give Russia a heightened
ability to apply significant economic pressure to Georgia, and it has often pursued this strategy at
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various flashpoints instead of military intervention. This, therefore, does not indicate causality
between direct economic leverage over Georgia and escalation.
Ultimately, the Georgian case study does not support H4 when examining the relative rate of
economic growth and when considering changes in Russia’s ability to exert economic pressure. Yet,
examination of this issue suggests that, rather than reacting to how its economy is faring when
compared to that of the U.S., Russia is responsive to expansion of its absolute economic capabilities.

Hypothesis conclusions
The Georgia case study supports H1 because of Russia’s evident willingness to intervene
militarily in the affairs of a non-NATO member NA state. The pattern of Russian intervention also
reflects a sensitivity to U.S. credibility, supporting H1A. This case also provides strong support for
H2, as Russia evidently intervened militarily in response to Georgia’s possible imminent acquisition
of a MAP. The case is favorable to H3 in a general sense, as while the IV did not vary across the
timeline, Russian intervention always involved proxy separatist forces. H4 was partially supported, as
comparison of the growth rates of Russia and the U.S. did not yield correlations, but Russia did
clearly act more aggressively when its economy had rebounded in absolute terms.

Estonia: Historical Overview
As the case examining the only NATO member from the subset in question, the Estonian
case study provides important support for this paper’s argument. Flashpoints for potential Russian
intervention against Estonia occurred in 1993, 2004 and 2007. In a manner consistent with Russian
behavior toward the non-NATO NA states, Russia refrained from intervention when its economy
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was faring poorly. Yet, by the late 2000s, when its economy had recovered, Russia intervened at a
significant level of intensity. However, while its interventions against Ukraine and Georgia reached
the intensity of overt military conflict, Russian intervention against Estonia remained capped at the
level of large-scale cyberattacks, which indicates an unwillingness to directly attack a NATO
member. A description of relevant historical events throughout the relationships between Estonia,
the Russian Federation and NATO will more easily facilitate discussion of the hypotheses.
Although the Estonian Republic gained independence during the interwar period of the early
twentieth century, it was forcibly occupied during World War II first by the Germans and
subsequently by the Soviet Union, in which it remained until the superpower’s final days.143 Estonia’s
bid for independence from the USSR, a concerted nonviolent nationwide effort, resulted in
Moscow’s unsuccessful mobilization of military force to halt the revolutionary proceedings.
Encouraged by new Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev’s introspective approach to reforming the
USSR’s political and cultural structure in the mid-1980s, an Estonian cultural revival promoting
traditional nationalistic songs emerged.144 This Estonian nationalist movement involved events like a
1988 Tallinn musical festival that attracted almost 25% of Estonia’s population and featured
members of the political leadership who advocated for Estonian independence.145 Supporters of
further Estonian autonomy included leadership of the governing Communist Party, which passed a
parliamentary declaration of Estonian sovereignty that, in addition to provisions like declarations of
ownership over Estonian natural resources, asserted the primacy of Estonian laws over Soviet laws.
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Over the next three years, these movements and mass events increased in power and frequency,

leading to the development of local government institutions in competition with the existing Soviet
structures.147 In 1991, during a Moscow Soviet nationalist coup, Soviet tanks and soldiers were
deployed into Estonia to prevent further defection, but nonviolent crowds of Estonians physically
blocked access to vital infrastructure until the coup’s failure the next day. This victory contributed to
the collapse of the USSR. Weeks later, the leadership of the new Russian state acknowledged the
formal independence of Estonia and the two other Baltic states.148
In the beginning and middle of the 1990s, Estonia’s tough stance on Russian troop
withdrawal and citizenship created a potential flashpoint with Russia. Estonia approached its
independence with the perspective of continuing the tenure of the Estonian Republic, which it
deemed illegally annexed by the USSR, as opposed to the formation of a new country. Estonian
readoption of its 1938 Law on Citizenship in 1992 therefore essentially prevented dozens of
thousands of ethnic Russians living in Estonia from automatically receiving Estonian citizenship.149
At this time, only slightly over 60% of the 1.6 million-person population in Estonia was ethnically
Estonian.150 Several months later, Estonia, in conjunction with the other Baltic states, demanded full
Russian removal of Soviet forces. Yet, after an Estonian presidential election in which over 40% of
the population was unable to vote as a result of the strict citizenship laws, Russian President Boris
Yeltsin stopped the removal of soldiers from the Baltic states and demanded more rights for the
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Russian populations in those states, appealing to the UN. In the eastern Estonian city of Narva,
known for its sizable Russian population, protests erupted against these Estonian government
policies.151 In the summer of 1993, after the Estonian Alien Registration Law demanded that people
who immigrated into Estonia during the Soviet period register with the government and denied
Estonian residence to retired Soviet military officers born after 1930, Russia severed its natural gas
flow to Estonia in protest.
Estonian President Lennart Meri then responded to Russian pressure by suspending the
Alien Registration law, but the city council of Narva, which not only held a large Russian population
but also faced rapid post-Soviet deindustrialization, declared a referendum on autonomy the day
after the law’s suspension. Although the vast majority of voters opted for autonomy, Narva’s leaders
conceded defeat after the Estonian Supreme Court declared the referendum illegitimate.152 Yet,
among other hardline Russian organizations in Estonia, a group of Russian veterans alleged human
rights violations to the UN. A Liberal Democratic Party politician called for retired Russian veterans
in Estonia to organize and enact armed resistance, but most Russian groups disavowed the calls to
arms.153
As debates over Russian minorities and troop withdrawal continued into 1994, Russian
statements against Estonian treatment of its Russian minorities slowed the troop withdrawal process.
After Estonia then claimed pre-1940 borders, which claimed territory then under Russian control,
Yeltsin fully halted troop withdrawal and sent the transitioning forces back to their Estonian bases. A
bilateral agreement facilitating troop withdrawal in exchange for the citizenship of 10,000 retired
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Soviet officers and families resolved that tension.154 While debates around these issues continued for
the rest of the decade, this period represented the highest degree of tension over these issues.
During this same period, Estonia had pushed for revision of borders. After 1994, Estonia
announced a more positive approach toward diplomacy with Russia and dropped the issue, although
this may have related both to an utter lack of support from the West on the issue at a time when
Estonia sought membership in the EU.155
Throughout this period, Estonia began to strengthen its relations with NATO, which
reached a more productive stage after the deescalation of Estonia’s immediate crises with Russia.
Estonia largely pursued this cooperation in conjunction with the other Baltic states. Estonia helped
to found the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in 1991, but the development of this
partnership largely began after 1993.156 Estonia joined the PFP in early 1994, and after the Russian
parliamentary elections in 1993 led to increasingly assertive Russian rhetoric, many Estonian leaders
suggested a turn toward the West out of concern for Russian intentions in the region.157 Estonia
opened an official dialogue with NATO about membership in 1996 and received a MAP in 1999
after NATO designated it a “probable applicant country.”158 Among other developments, Estonia
and the other Baltic states increased their defense spending to meet the NATO 2% GDP target at

“Chronology for Russians in Estonia.” Minorities at Risk Project, 2004.
Viktorova, Jevgenia. “Conflict Transformation the Estonian Way: The Estonian-Russian Border
Conflict, European Integration and Shifts in Discursive Representation of the ‘Other.’” Perspectives,
no. 27 (2006): 50.
156
“Estonia in NATO.” Estonian Atlantic Treaty Organization. Accessed March 22, 2020.
157
Park. “Russia and Estonian Security.” Europe-Asia Studies (1995): 29.
158
“Estonia in NATO.” Estonian Atlantic Treaty Organization.
154
155

Rabin 78
the turn of the century.159 Estonia and NATO held accession talks in 2002 and 2003, and NATO
eventually granted Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania membership in 2004.160
Russia frequently responded to these signs of progress in closeness between Estonia and
NATO with economic punishments, like its 1994 denial of Most Favored Nation status to Estonia
and bans on select Estonian imports. Yet, Estonia’s 2004 NATO accession happened to coincide
with its 2004 EU accession, preventing subsequent arbitrary economic measures as a result of the
common market.161 At this point, the Russian response toward this NATO expansion remained
mixed. Putin grudgingly labeled the prospect of Estonian NATO accession a non-threat in 2002.162
Yet, Russia anticipated Estonia’s NATO accession with hints of red line statements, a general
parliamentary declaration against further NATO expansion and an alleged incursion into Estonian
airspace the month before accession.
Despite this clear animosity, however, Russia’s response remained largely rhetorical.163
Russia’s aggressive tone simmered soon after the official accession. Putin noted later in 2004 that
every country has the right to choose its preferred form of security and that, despite his objections,
he hoped NATO’s expansion would increase international trust.164 In 2005, however, Russia cut off
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talks with Estonia about its border, citing negative Estonian comments about the country’s history
under the USSR.165
In 2007, Estonia-Russian relations reached their most drastic flashpoint, including
cyberattacks widely interpreted as authorized by the Russian government, when the Estonian
government removed a statue honoring Soviet soldiers who fought in World War II from its
prominent place of display. The Estonian government claims it moved the statue from the public
square and to rebury the remains of Soviet soldiers in a military cemetery because, beginning in
2005, radical Soviet revisionist groups had started to convene at the statue.166 Despite the approval
of several prominent Russian politicians and alleged Estonian efforts to include Russia in the
relocation process, Moscow accused the Estonian government of anti-Russian sentiment.167 The day
that Estonia began the statue’s relocation process, April 26, 2007, the country was hit with
cyberattacks that lasted for weeks. The first wave of attacks appeared uncoordinated, poorly funded
and facilitated through hacking forums. The day these attacks began, Russia suddenly dismantled
strategically significant railroads for alleged maintenance work. Analysis of these first attacks
indicates they were likely not orchestrated directly by the Kremlin.168
Large riots in Estonia accompanied the first wave of cyberattacks. Riots in the center of the
Estonian capital Tallinn, in which mostly ethnic Russian protesters chanted “Russia” and brandished
Russian flags, resulted in nearly 100 documented instances of vandalism and looting. Rioting,
involving the burning of the statue of an Estonian military leader who opposed Russia in Estonia’s
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1918 independence war, also broke out in Johvi and Kohtla-Jarve, far northeastern Estonian towns
with majority ethnic Russian populations.169 Estonian leaders accused Russia of funding and
deploying many of the rioters.170 In Moscow, the pro-Putin Russian nationalist youth group Nashi
organized large protests blockading the Estonian embassy for over a week and physically disrupted a
press conference with the Estonian ambassador.171
When the protests in Estonia quieted one week later, a second wave of cyberattacks — more
closely coordinated and more advanced in capability than the first — began. This wave has been
more closely linked to the Russian government. This sophisticated wave targeted Estonian banks —
a shrewd choice, given the Estonian population’s incredibly high reliance upon online banking at the
time. The attacks peaked on a prominent Russian national holiday and dissipated after several weeks.
172

Many IP addresses of those responsible for the Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack
pointed to Russian nationals, including former employees of political parties. Additionally, the
structure of the attacks, including the start at midnight Moscow time, the apparently coordinated
end of the attacks and the attacks’ advanced flexibility to adapt to countermeasures, indicated central
control and collection of intelligence throughout the attacks.173 These aspects, in conjunction with
the non-cyber Russian measures and Russian refusal to assist in combating the attacks, led Estonian
politicians to accuse Russia of interfering in Estonian internal affairs.174 Russia denied playing any
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role and claimed that independent “patriotic” groups and hackers were responsible. Estonia
subsequently tightened its relations with NATO, as well as its cyber infrastructure capability, in the
years following these attacks. In 2008, Estonia and NATO established the NATO Co-operation
Cyber Defence Center of Excellence in Estonia.175
Minor disputes and arguments emerged between the two countries in the following years,
but their relations generally improved from their 2007 low point in the following years, although
several Russian agents were discovered in Estonian government positions in the early 2010s. Talks
about the border resumed in 2012. Yet, they soured again in late 2014 when Russia apparently
abducted Estonian intelligence official Eston Kohver on the Estonian side of a border crossing.
Kohver had anticipated meeting Russian smuggling informants, but smoke and stun grenades
launched from the Russian area of the border obscured his backup team’s view while he was
removed from the meeting point. A joint Estonia-Russia border guard report initially confirmed that
the border security had been violated from the Russian side, but Russian officials later refused to
confirm this statement. Throughout his career, Kohver disrupted smuggling operations potentially
linked to the Russian FSB’s criminal networks.176 However, it is also notable that his abduction
occurred merely two days after U.S. President Barack Obama visited Tallinn to reaffirm NATO’s
commitment to defending Estonia.177 After Russia sentenced Kohver to 15 years in prison in 2015,
Estonia secured his freedom for the exchange of a Russian mole arrested in Estonia in 2012.178
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Relations have since remained somewhat icy. NATO launched large-scale drills in the Baltic
region in 2015 and announced plans to expand its conventional arsenal in the Baltic, while in turn
Russia expanded its nuclear arsenal.179 As of 2018, Russia had not ratified a border treaty signed with
Estonia in 2015, preventing the solidification of a formal border accord.180 Low-level tension has
persisted, as Russia has taken actions like airspace violations in the Baltic states and established a
helicopter based on a small island between Estonia and Finland.181
Throughout Estonia’s relationship with Russia, several potential opportunities for Russian
escalation of intensity levels have occurred. Serious intervention has occurred only at the point of
the 2007 cyberattacks, and no escalation to the point of military action has occurred. The point at
which Russia responded to its 1993 disagreements with Estonia by freezing natural gas pipelines
represented a potential opportunity for higher level intervention, as Russia was moving large
numbers of troops throughout Estonia and considered its large minority population in Estonia to be
threatened. The second potential flashpoint at which potential Russian intervention seems plausible
is Estonia’s 2004 NATO accession. The third major flashpoint, at which the most intense Russian
intervention in Estonian affairs since Estonian independence occurred, was the 2007 crisis. Yet, it is
notable that this intervention did not reach the intensity level of military action. Although Russia
seemingly opted for large-scale cyberattacks in conjunction with physical pressure on the Estonian
embassy, an armed action against the embassy or incursion into a heavily Russian area like Narva
could have occurred. Yet, it did not.
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Estonia: Hypothesis Analysis
H1: Near abroad states with NATO membership are more likely to successfully achieve general deterrence toward
Russia.
H1 implies that Russia is less likely to instigate an armed conflict against an NA state with
NATO membership. The Estonian case study, judged from Estonia’s 2004 accession and onward,
ultimately supports this hypothesis. Yet, H1 alone cannot explain the lack of Russian intervention
escalation at the 1993 flashpoint.
Since Estonia joined NATO in 2004, Russia has not intervened militarily in Estonian affairs,
despite its occasionally threatening rhetoric and ominous troop movements. Instead, in the 2007
bilateral diplomatic crisis involving the highest level of Russian intervention, Russia opted for
cyberattacks. This move indicates some degree of restraint on the part of the Russians, given the
seemingly provocative nature of the Estonian government’s decision to relocate the statue and
graves. Russia did not choose to restrain from intervening in this instance. Its leaders indeed
considered the stimulus worthy of a large-scale response against the Estonian government and
populace. Yet, it confined this response to the cyber domain and, if indeed linked to the
government, to support of protests in Estonia and intimidation of the Estonian ambassador in
Moscow.182 These measures were the extent of the immediate Russian response, but conditions
during some of these flashpoints could have presented potential incentives for Russian military
action. The pro-Russian violence in Tallinn certainly would have provided encouragement, but
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perhaps more significant are the protests that occurred in northeastern Estonia. These protests
emerged in majority-Russian towns mere miles from the Russian border.
These factors presented possible conditions for a Russian military incursion, and these
conditions are indeed discernible in instances of Russian military action like the annexation of
Crimea. Yet, Russia refrained from any military intervention against Estonia. Furthermore, even the
Russian cyberattacks remained within domains likely considered to be at a safe distance from sectors
of cyberspace that could trigger enactment of the NATO Article V collective defense mechanism.
Considered together, these factors indicate a deliberate Russian ambition to intervene but also a
distinct restraint from intervention that could provoke NATO.
It should be noted that although the Estonian case study indicates Russian sensitivity to
NATO during the 2007 crisis, there is no point before Estonia’s NATO accession at which Russia
displayed a willingness to intervene at a higher level during a comparable crisis. There is therefore no
pre-accession case of military intervention to compare to the post-accession case of substantial
non-military intervention. During the period of tense Estonian-Russian relations in the early 1990s,
Russia took steps to indicate its disapproval of Estonian diplomacy. At the point at which Russia
halted its Estonian gas flows in 1993, Russia had troops stationed within Estonia and remained
extremely vocal in its concerns about the Estonian government’s perceived marginalization of ethnic
Russians. Russia halted the withdrawal of its troops and returned them to their former posts during a
particularly contentious diplomatic exchange, but no military intervention actually occurred.
Overall, The case supports H1. Although an intervention in the 1990s would have helped to
link Estonia and H1, H1 simply predicts that Russia will not act militarily after NATO accession, not
that Russia will always be intervening if a state is not in NATO. The factors present during the 2007
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flashpoint indicate a Russian sensitivity to a potential NATO response, even if this cannot be fully
confirmed without an example of high-level intervention before accession for comparison.

H1A: The United States’ credibility positively affects near abroad states’ abilities to deter Russia.
H1A argues that the United States’ credibility as a powerful actor with the willingness and
capability to respond militarily to Russian aggression impacts Russia’s willingness to intervene in the
affairs of the country in question. The intensity levels of Russian intervention in Estonian affairs
over time support this hypothesis, although the capping of Russian escalation levels to cyberattacks
and diplomatic intimidation during the 2007 crisis likely results from the predictions of H1 as well as
those of H1A.
The early 1990s and early 2000s marked a strong point for the U.S.’s military credibility. Its
performance in the 1990 Operation Desert Shield and 1991 Operation Desert Storm operations
showcased the elite capabilities of American conventional forces. These events not only announced
the U.S.’s willingness to intervene in foreign affairs with its conventional might but also signaled the
implications of the onset of a unipolar world helmed by a hegemonic U.S. Russia, the legal successor
to the USSR, was unlikely to test the U.S.’s patience at this point. It should be noted that the U.S. had
not communicated a distinct interest in incorporating the Baltic states into NATO at the time, but in
this context it is unlikely that Russia would have sought to antagonize the situation in that region
through military intervention. Similarly, the U.S. enjoyed a credible reputation for effective
conventional intervention during Estonia’s 2002 and 2003 NATO accession talks. The U.S.’s 2001
invasion of Afghanistan and 2003 invasion of Iraq again highlighted its conventional power and
willingness to intervene militarily abroad.
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By 2007, the year during which Russia chose to respond to Estonian internal affairs with
massive cyberattacks, U.S. credibility as an effective and willing military power had waned. The U.S.
invasions in the Middle East had created widespread insurgencies, and the counterinsurgency
operations required colossal American investments in finances and manpower. The wars became
deeply unpopular domestically, and the prospect of additional U.S. military deployment to another
area of the world with a delicate political balance — especially against a resurgent European power
— was unlikely to appeal to voters and policymakers. A U.S. military response was even more
unlikely in the event of cyberattacks limited to non-kinetic domains. Enough U.S. credibility likely
remained to disincentivize a Russian military action in this case — a reality that supports H1 due to
the U.S.’s position as a major driver of NATO’s military muscle. Yet, the Russian leadership still felt
comfortable pursuing massive cyberattacks in this case.
Ultimately, the Russian pattern of nonintervention at the first two flashpoints and low-level
intervention at the third flashpoint corresponds well to the trajectory of American conventional
might and willpower.

H2: Overt NATO deliberations surrounding an NA state’s possible entry without officially giving membership
decrease that state’s ability to deter Russia.
H2 posits that as a state overtly progresses toward NATO membership, Russia is more likely
to intervene in that country’s affairs. While the Estonian case study does not seem to provide
supportive evidence for this hypothesis, this absence of assertive behavior in anticipation of
potential Estonian NATO membership may result from external factors.
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In the leadup to Estonia’s NATO accession, between the 1999 MAP provision and 2002,
Russia did not instigate military action or even low-intensity isolated military actions in response
against Estonia. Considering the core assumption guiding this hypothesis that for Russia, and
especially for Putin, NA state NATO accession inherently creates an undesirable zero-sum loss, this
lack of aggressive responses to Estonia’s pursuit of NATO membership seems aberrational. In the
context of Russia’s critical rhetoric regarding the Estonian government’s disparagement of the Soviet
1940 takeover — an issue important not only for Russian national pride but also for potential
Russian reparations responsibilities — this seems even more surprising.183
Yet, despite the likelihood that even at that time Russian leaders viewed Estonian NATO
accession unfavorably, Russia opted for non-intervention likely because of external factors like its
own aspirations for its relationship with NATO, its potential acknowledgement of the Baltic
countries’ eventual acceptance into NATO and the aforementioned increase in U.S. credibility as
Estonia’s accession became increasingly likely. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, Russian leaders were
actively seeking to develop a positive Russia-NATO relationship, even if largely to enhance Russia’s
influence upon the alliance’s decision-making processes.184 Prior to 1997, Russian leaders were likely
not overly concerned with a potentially imminent accession for Estonia, as the U.S. had taken a
careful approach epitomized by Secretary of Defense William Perry’s statement that Estonia was not
prepared to enter the alliance. When Madeleine Albright became U.S. Secretary of State in 1997, the
U.S. began to openly consider Estonian accession more seriously.185 Pressuring Estonia, now a likely
candidate for eventual NATO accession, would likely have inserted a roadblock into these relations.
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Putin’s statements and actions at the onset of his presidency also indicate that Estonia’s
imminent accession may have become an unavoidable reality to Russia by that time. In early 2001,
Putin signed a declaration with the president of Lithuania — a fellow Baltic country to which
Estonia remained closely linked in its pursuit of NATO membership — recognizing each country’s
right to pursue its own security in any manner not jeopardizing the security of other countries.186
While Putin’s subsequent statements in June 2002 showed that he did not favor the Baltics’
accessions, this joint declaration indicates he did not consider challenging the Baltics’ accessions
worth the price of provoking the U.S. and NATO.187 Relating to H1A, these remarks and the most
intense steps of Estonia’s path to NATO occurred soon after the U.S. launched Operation Enduring
Freedom and invaded Afghanistan in October 2001, certainly a serious sign of its credibility at the
time as a capable and willing military power. The ensuing American invasion of Iraq in 2003
emphasized this point. At the time, the calculus for Russia reflected nonintervention as the most
reasonable option, regardless of Russian preferences.

H3: Near abroad states are less likely to successfully deter Russia if Russia is able to use a covert method of attack.
H3 argues Russia is more likely to intervene if it is able to employ methods of attack that
provide it with plausible deniability. This capability for Russia revolves around its ability to rely on
capable proxy forces. The degree to which these forces are actually available in Estonia is highly
debatable; much scholarly discourse focuses on majority-ethnic Russian town Narva and similar
areas as pockets of potential latent separatism that Russia could exploit. Yet, this population does
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not actually appear to harbor capable and strong-willed separatist militia groups available for Russian
exploitation. Furthermore, since its independence, Estonia has fostered local defense groups that
likely present a further obstacle for foreign mobilization of proxies within the population. The
Estonian case study thus provides some support for H3, since a lack of viable proxy groups has thus
far corresponded with a lack of military intervention.
At first glance, conditions in areas like Narva seem parallel to those in Crimea and the
Georgian separatist republics. The population largely consists of Russophone ethnic Russians whose
families immigrated to the area under Soviet administration. Narva’s leadership also organized a
referendum for autonomy after Estonia’s split from the Soviet Union. The town and its neighboring
areas also saw pro-Russian rioting during the 2007 crisis. These factors create conditions similar to
those in areas where Russia has attempted to mobilize the population in separatist conflicts.
Yet, notable differences set Narva apart from these areas. The Narva leadership
acknowledged that it would abide by the Estonian court’s ruling on its autonomy referendum even
before the court announced its ruling, showing a level of deference to the governing NA state not
characteristic of the other separatist movements. The area’s inhabitants also point to the adjacent
Russian region’s poverty as a deterrent for seeking incorporation into Russia.188 When a politician in
the 1990s attempted to organize an armed rebellion of Russian veterans in Estonia, prominent
Russian groups in eastern Estonia opposed him. The existence and active participation of locally
networked Estonian paramilitary defense groups like the Estonian Defense League, which played a
key role in preventing the Soviet capture of Estonian broadcasting services in the early 1990s, has
also likely provided a serious deterrent. The pro-Russian sentiment and organizational structures
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that Russia seeks simply do not exist in sufficient quantities, and these factors have remained
constant since the first flashpoint of the early 1990s.
It is also notable that Russia’s most serious intervention in Estonian affairs, which occurred
years after Estonia’s NATO accession, was largely limited to the cyber domain. Despite the qualified
conclusions of experts in the field, it is exceedingly difficult to confirm beyond a reasonable doubt,
with concrete evidence, that the Russian government played a central role in organizing the attacks.
This opacity likely played a major role in Russia’s decision to employ cyberattacks. It could apply
coercive force against Estonia while maintaining a degree of plausible deniability.

H4: The extent of Russian intervention in the affairs of near abroad states reflects the strength of the Russian
economic strategic position.
H4 posits that Russia’s economic strategic position determines its willingness to intervene in
NA states’ affairs. This position can be examined either by tracking Russia’s relative economic
strength and growth when compared to powerful NATO members like the U.S. or by examining any
direct economic leverage Russia has over the NA state in question. Ultimately, while the Russian
growth rate relative to that of the U.S. does not seem to play a significant role in Russian-decision
making, absolute Russian growth in this case does seem to be an indicator supporting H4.
Russia’s economy, relative to that of the U.S., fared poorly in the early 1990s. As Russian
leaders transitioned Russia from a centrally controlled economy to a market economy, Russia’s GDP
contracted significantly. With shrinkage rates increasing from -3% in 1990 to -12.57% in 1994,
Russia was unlikely to pursue a costly intervention in Estonia — especially when considering the
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chaotic impact of economic reformation.189 When this data is paired with the U.S.’s steady growth
during that time period, with GDP growth ranging from 1.88% in 1990 to 4.02% in 1994, Russia’s
strategic position for pursuing provocative interventions was meager.190
Leading up to the 2004 flashpoint, the playing field became more level in terms of GDP
growth. Although Russia’s economy suffered from a debt default in the late 1990s, the reemerged
economy of the new millennium was finally performing well. At that point, Russia’s GDP was
expanding, continuing from 5.1% in 2001 to 7.2% in 2004.191 The U.S.’s economy was still
continuing along its steady growth trend, ranging from .99% in 2001 to 3.79% in 2004. When Russia
escalated to its highest level of intervention in 2007, its economy was thriving. Russian GDP grew by
6.4% in 2005, 8.2% in 2006 and 8.5% in 2007.192 Comparatively, the U.S. economy was still growing
steadily (although at a decreasing rate), expanding 3.51% in 2005, 2.85% in 2006 and 1.87% in 2007.
193

Russian growth in both absolute and relative terms was high at the 2004 and 2007 flashpoints.

While it supports intervention in 2007, it does not correspond with nonintervention in 2004.
Throughout Russia’s relationship with Estonia, it has provided much of Estonia’s energy
resources and has leveraged this position at various flashpoints. In 1993, a point at which Russia
apparently supplied all of Estonia’s natural gas, Russia cut off its natural gas flows to Estonia in
response to the Estonian residency controversy.194 Similarly, during the 2007 crisis, Russia halted its
oil supply to Estonia. Russia’s leveraging of its strategic position aligns well with the flashpoints, but
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it does not explain the lack of intervention during the earlier two flashpoints, as the availability of
this strategy as a coercive tool was consistently available.
Although the balance of relative Russian and U.S. growth rates does not appear to drive
Russian escalation in the Estonian case study, the nonintervention and lower level interference of the
early 1990s and early 2000s, as well as the intervention at the 2007 flashpoint, support the hypothesis
when Russia’s absolute growth is the metric considered. Essentially, the comparison between U.S.
and Russian growth rates does not seem to play a significant role, while the rate of Russian growth
examined by itself seems a successful indicator.

Hypothesis conclusions
The Estonia case supports H1 overall, as even though no high-level intervention occurred
before Estonia’s NATO accession to confirm that the 2007 cyber attack was a muted response, the
Russian decision to cap its escalation at the cyber domain — especially subdomains that likely were
utilized to avoid definitive attribution — indicates that considerations of NATO affected Russian
decision-making. In a manner similar to the Georgia case, due to the similarities in flashpoint timing,
the Estonian case supports H1A, as U.S. credibility was high in the 1990s and early 2000s, but it had
decreased substantially by the time of the 2007 cyber attacks. This case largely does not provide
support for H2’s predictions that Russia would interfere to prevent Estonia’s NATO accession,
although this may result from the negative effects of economic weakness, a prediction of H4, rather
than a lack of desire to intervene. The case also appears to support H3’s predictions that Russia is
more likely to escalate its intervention to levels at which covert tactics afford plausible deniability.
Although a potential target population exists, it has not been the direct subject of Russian
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intervention attempts, unlike the Georgia and Ukraine cases, because it appears unwilling to provide
a proxy role. Yet, Russia was willing to use large-scale cyberattacks because Estonia’s highly
interconnected system proved particularly vulnerable, while the tactic provided plausible deniability.
If the first wave of cyberattacks was indeed unrelated to the Russian government, the fact that
Russia likely organized the second wave seems to result from the successful shield of deniability
provided by the first wave. In a manner similar to the Georgian case, the Estonian case provides
some of the strongest support for H4 in terms of Russian growth.

Chapter 4: The Findings
Comparative Hypothesis Analysis
H1: Near abroad states with NATO membership are more likely to successfully achieve general deterrence toward
Russia.
Comparison of each case’s results for H1 indicates that NATO membership is an effective
deterrent of Russian military intervention. Russia was willing to intervene in Ukraine in 2014 and in
Georgia in 2008. The independent variable of NATO membership has remained consistent for both
countries; neither Ukraine nor Georgia has achieved NATO membership. Yet, while Russia readily
intervened militarily in the affairs of these non-NATO member NA states, it has completely
refrained from acting militarily against Estonia, which entered NATO in 2004. When examining this
question across the cases, the pattern supports the claim that NATO membership deters Russian
military intervention.
In the case of Estonia, it is also significant that the level of intervention, when one flashpoint
resulted in an instance of escalation, remained below the thresholds of both armed conflict and
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territorial annexation. In 2007, Russia intervened through cyber attacks as opposed to military
methods. When military intervention was possible, Russia refrained not only from military action but
also from targeting specific domains that were most likely to trigger NATO action. This apparent
intervention cap, in comparison to the armed interventions of Georgia in 1993 and 2008 and in
Ukraine in 2014, further suggests that NATO membership deters military intervention.
Yet, it should be noted that Russia also did not intervene militarily in Estonia’s affairs before
Estonia entered NATO. Therefore, while the IV varies within the Estonia case study, the internal
variation does not confirm the cross-case conclusion. This paper will later argue that the
non-intervention during the 1993 flashpoints in all three cases is a result of the predictions of H4,
rather than a failure of H1.

H1A: The United States’ credibility positively affects near abroad states’ abilities to deter Russia.
Examination of H1A’s predictions across the cases indicates that U.S. credibility as a willing
and effective force deployer effectively deters Russian military intervention against NA NATO
members and NA non-NATO member states. In the early 1990s, when the U.S. was a newly
emerged hegemon that had demonstrated its military power during Operations Desert Shield and
Desert Storm, Russia largely refrained from escalating against these countries to the intensity level of
military action. No intervention occurred in Estonia or Ukraine in 1993. The apparent exception
comes in the form of its limited support for Georgian separatists, but this support, which may have
been only tacitly supported by Yeltsin, remained confined to a small scale and does not appear to be
truly state-sanctioned. Therefore, while this example represents more serious intervention than
espionage, this paper does not consider it a true limited military intervention. Similarly, after the U.S.
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deployed on a large scale to Afghanistan and Iraq in the early 2000s, Russia did not intervene
militarily during the Georgian 2003 or 2004 flashpoints, Estonian 2004 flashpoint or Ukrainian 2004
flashpoint.
Yet, by the mid-to-late 2000s, a clear shift in U.S. credibility occurred. The opportunities
created for Russia are evident, as Russia intervened militarily in the non-NATO NA states and at the
cyber level in Estonia after this point. By the 2007 Estonian flashpoint and 2008 Georgian
flashpoint, the U.S.’s deep and somewhat unsuccessful entrenchment in Afghanistan and Iraq had
decreased its credibility. In an infamous incident just before Russia’s 2014 military intervention in
Ukraine, U.S. leadership failed to enforce its red line in Syria, incurring serious domestic ridicule.
This pattern within each case and consistent across all three cases provides clear support for the
relevance of H1A. It should be noted that while H1A corresponds with these patterns, it is likely not
a driving force affecting Russian decisions due to specific NATO threats but rather a broad indicator
of the effects of U.S. engagement abroad.

H2: Overt NATO deliberations surrounding an NA state’s possible entry without officially giving membership
decrease that state’s ability to deter Russia.
Findings from the case studies indicate H2 predicts accurately after the mid-2000s, although
the hypothesis did not appear to predict accurately before the mid-2000s. In response to states’
progress toward NATO membership in the mid-to-late 2000s, Russia acted to destabilize those
countries and prevent NATO accession. Russia intervened militarily against Georgia in 2008 and
later acted in 2014 to destabilize Ukraine. Yet, when Estonia progressed along the path to NATO
membership after 1999 and acceded in 2004, despite negative Russian rhetoric, no intervention
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occurred. Non-intervention in this case contradicts the predictions of H2. This seems to indicate a
distinct shift in the mid-to-late 2000s from unwillingness to willingness to block states’ NATO
accession via intervention. This paper will later argue that this shift likely derives from the effects
predicted by H4.

H3: Near abroad states are less likely to successfully deter Russia if Russia is able to use a covert method of attack.
Examination of the cases generally supports the claim that Russia is more likely to intervene
or to escalate its intervention if methods providing plausible deniability are available. In the
Ukrainian case, the availability and strength of the Crimean separatist movement corresponded with
Russian attempts to destabilize Ukraine through Crimea, including serious armed intervention
during the second such flashpoint. Russia’s annexation of Crimea and attempts to carve out sections
of eastern Ukraine relied upon its ability to mobilize separatist armies, as well as its ability to deploy
Russian soldiers and feasibly disguise them as Crimean separatists. In the Georgian case, the IV did
not vary; separatist proxies and allies were consistently available. This does not suggest that Russia
would constantly intervene militarily in Georgian affairs; rather, it is significant that both instances of
Russian military action in Georgia directly involved separatists and mingled Russian forces with
those of the separatists.
The Estonian case also provides several strains of support for this hypothesis. The Estonian
region bordering Russia houses a poorly assimilated and majority-ethnic Russian population, similar
to the communities from which Russia extracted proxies in Ukraine and Georgia; however, this
group has generally displayed little desire to leave Estonia for Russia. Correspondingly, Russia has
not seriously and actively attempted to weaponize this population as proxies or to attempt covert
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convention operations under the guise of Estonian separatists. This provides an example of
non-intervention when a population does not provide substantial viable proxies, which complements
Russia’s evident tendency for intervention when such proxies are reasonably viable, as in Ukraine
and Georgia. Yet, Russia opted for cyber attacks, which inherently enable plausible deniability, to
weaken Estonia’s highly networked online infrastructure. The cover afforded by this tactic appears
significant in Russia’s decision to act against Estonia. In all cases, Russia appears to favor methods of
instigation, attack or interference that offer plausible deniability.

H4: The extent of Russian intervention in the affairs of near abroad states reflects the strength of the Russian
economic strategic position.
Comparative analysis of the case studies substantially supports H4’s prediction that Russia’s
strategic economic position significantly influences its intervention calculus. The impact of Russia’s
growth relative to that of the U.S. proved less illuminating than anticipated, as the case studies did
not reflect significant variation in conjunction with the two states’ comparative rates. However,
variation matched isolated overall Russian growth trends more closely, and Russia’s absolute growth
corresponded significantly with its intervention patterns. The Ukraine case study demonstrated this
connection, as Russia did not intervene at its 1993 flashpoint, as its economy struggled, or at its
2004 flashpoint, by which its economy had just recovered from its downward spiral. Russian
intervention in Ukraine occurred in 2014, after the country’s economy had grown significantly.
The intensity of Russian intervention in Georgia follows a similar pattern, although the
small-scale intervention of the early 1990s warrants discussion. While this intervention did occur at a
point of economic shrinkage, as discussed previously, it remained quite limited. As in the Ukraine
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case study, Russia refrained from intervention in 2004 but pursued it in 2008, after its economy had
rebounded and grown enormously. The Estonia case study reflects the same general pattern as the
other two cases. No intervention occurred at its 1993 and 2004 flashpoints, and Russia’s cyber
intervention occurred in 2007, just after Russia’s initial economic resurgence. The pattern of Russian
nonintervention during periods of economic weakness and significant intervention when the
country fared well economically is clear and consistent across all cases. Furthermore, this pattern is
evident chronologically. Russia engaged in almost no military intervention in these states in the early
1990s and early 2000s but engaged in interventions against all three states between the mid-2000s
and mid-2010s.

Hypothesis Synthesis
Considered together, the implications of the case studies for the hypotheses predict that
Russia is most likely to intervene militarily if it is performing well economically and the NA state in
question is a non-NATO member progressing toward membership. Russia is even more likely to
intervene if these factors remain true and if Russia can instigate or prosecute an intervention with
plausible deniability — especially at a time when the U.S. is unlikely to interfere militarily with
Russia’s plans.
This conclusion is visible when a two-stage periodization of Russian intervention, in
consideration of the five hypotheses, is constructed. From the early 1990s until the mid-2000s, the
negative predictions of H4 — that Russia will not intervene militarily in NA states when its economy
is struggling — are dominant over the predictions of the other hypotheses. Regardless of Russia’s
degree of interest in intervening during this period of poverty, it refrained from doing so. This
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correlation also aligns nearly perfectly with the pattern of H1A’s implications. This is only logical;
Russia opts for nonintervention when its economy is faring poorly, which is also a situation in which
the deterrent power of a credible U.S. military and political will proves especially potent. This period,
during which Russia had little ability to intervene and little desire to do so in the face of decisive U.S.
military superiority, manifests H4’s predictions for Russian nonintervention.
The mid-to-late 2000s prove to be a liminal point at which Russian poverty and
corresponding nonintervention (Stage 1) transition into economic strength and corresponding
intervention (Stage 2). At this point, H4’s negative predictions cease to be true, and H4’s positive
predictions of the impact of Russian prosperity on its appetite for intervention begin to apply.
During this second period, H4’s implications no longer prevent the other hypotheses’ predictions
from impacting Russian behavior. When Russia is performing well economically, the interaction of
the implications of H1 and H2 becomes the dominant factor. In Stage 2, if an NA state is a NATO
member, Russia is extremely unlikely to pursue military intervention. However, if a non-NATO
member NA state is seriously progressing toward membership, Russia is more likely to pursue
preventive intervention to either coerce the NA state into remaining in the Russian sphere of
influence or to render that state an undesirable and unstable candidate for NATO.
In Stage 2, as in Stage 1, H1A is influential. All three instances of Stage 2 Russian
intervention discussed in the case studies occurred at points at which a challenge from the U.S. was
perceived as implausible due to U.S. engagement elsewhere or notable failures to act on its deterrent
threats. Just as Russia intervenes less intensely against NATO members, it apparently selects into
interventions at points with low likelihoods of active U.S. challenges.
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This periodization is crucial for understanding why Russia did not intervene while Estonia
approached and achieved NATO membership but has yet displayed a consistent willingness to
intervene to prevent Ukrainian and Georgian membership. Essentially, the Estonian accession
process occurred during Stage 1, while Ukraine and Georgia only began to seriously pursue and
progress toward membership during Stage 2. When Estonia secured a MAP in 1999, entered NATO
accession discussions in 2002 and acceded in 2004, Russia responded rhetorically but was not
positioned economically to intervene, especially during a time when the newly dominant U.S. could
reasonably threaten to defend NATO’s interests. Yet, by the mid-to-late 2000s, Russia had developed
the economic capability to issue challenges in defense of its interests and to withstand the economic
consequences of its interventions. This resurgence corresponds well with a fivefold increase in the
prices of oil and gas, which would have given Russia increased leverage over the international
community.195 This period also coincided with the waning of U.S. credibility during its Global War
on Terrorism. These factors permitted Russia to intervene in 2007 — although Estonia’s NATO
status resulted in a cap on the intervention intensity level. These factors also invited Russian
intervention in 2008; Georgia’s non-NATO status permitted military intervention, while its overt
progression toward membership actively encouraged Russian intervention.
In terms of the hypotheses, the restrictions of a weak economy under Stage 1 H4 prevented
Russian intervention during Estonia’s accession process, while the increased flexibility provided by a
stronger economy under Stage 2 H4, permitted Russian intervention generally against all three
countries. This largely occurred with the aid of H3’s predictions, the benefits of employing a covert
strategy providing plausible deniability, at points in time permitted by H1A’s negative implications, or
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moments at which the U.S. was in a poor position to pick fights abroad. In the economically sound
Stage 2 of H4, while H1 prevented Russia from escalating its Estonian intervention beyond
cyberattacks and minor threats against diplomats due to Estonia’s NATO status, H2 induced Russia
to intervene against Ukraine and Georgia at high intensities since those countries were advancing
toward NATO membership. These interventions in the midst of Ukraine and Georgia’s progressions
toward NATO membership essentially blocked further serious progress and thereby prevented H1,
the deterrence provided by NATO membership, from becoming relevant to these states. The
periodized synthesis of these hypotheses’ implications is represented in the following figure.

In summary, this periodization’s dissection of the hypotheses’ relevance to the case studies
demonstrates that Russia refrains from directly attacking NATO members but may intervene when
states approach membership, as long as it has the capability of doing so.
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Chapter 5: Concluding Thoughts and Broader Implications
This study has sought to illuminate the factors that drive Russian intervention and
nonintervention against other ex-Soviet states, as a cursory examination of Russia’s regional foreign
relations revealed a variation in intervention levels across different circumstances. Internal and
comparative analysis of the three case studies, which represented the totality of such cases up to this
point in time, has yielded significant findings. When Russia’s economic capabilities were stunted in
the 1990s and early 2000s, no major intervention occurred against these NA states, even during
severe diplomatic crises.
After Russia’s economic recovery in the mid-2000s, it displayed a willingness to intervene in
its near abroad, although the intensity of its actions depended on whether a state had already
achieved NATO membership or was a non-member pursuing membership. In 2007, Russia evidently
was willing to launch a large-scale intervention against NATO member Estonia, but this
intervention remained capped at the intensity level of cyberattacks. Russia has not intervened
militarily against Estonia. However, Russia was willing to act militarily against non-NATO states at
this time, as it invaded Georgia in 2008, annexed Crimea in 2014 and launched a separatist conflict
in eastern Ukraine the same year. In these situations, the ability to intervene in a covert way seemed
to have increased Russia’s level of intervention.
The examination was inspired by events that altered the course of twenty-first century
international relations and resulted in concrete and serious consequences for the populations
involved. It is therefore critical not only to consider what lessons and patterns can be extracted from
the past but also to explore these findings’ implications for the future across multiple domains of
international politics.
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Most directly, the findings hold implications for how Russia may interact with countries
within its near abroad in the future. The obvious prediction stemming from this thesis is that if
other post-Soviet neighboring states indicate interest in and make serious progress toward NATO
membership — perhaps signified by a MAP program — Russia is likely to intervene militarily. This
possibility is elevated if those states have pro-Russian separatist groups or pockets of ethnic Russian
minority populations that are poorly integrated into that country’s cultural fabric, as Russia could
either attempt to mobilize those groups or disguise its own troops as members of those groups. Yet,
this hinges on Russia’s ability to weather potential punitive actions from the international
community, which in turn depends on Russia’s economic capacity.
If Russia attempts this strategy against multiple states in too condensed a period of time, it
risks incurring massive economic sanctions that would prevent it from pursuing such activities. Such
a situation would therefore prove an interesting case for the findings of this paper. It may present a
scenario in which Russia is presented with several countries in which it would hope to keep out of
NATO, but it is forced to limit its intervention to only one or two of those states due to material
constraints. Yet, this policy of attempting simultaneous NA state accessions would prove a risky
course of action for NATO; Russia might combat this NATO effort by targeting one or two key
states, assuming that NATO leaders would not continue their course when faced with such
aggression. In this situation, considerations of the credibility of potential U.S. intervention and of
possible covert intervention avenues may play outsized roles in Russian decision-making. Otherwise,
new factors beyond the scope of this paper may ultimately force those decisions.
This paper’s conclusions also hold significant implications for how the U.S. and NATO may
seek to proceed with diplomacy in eastern Europe. Visible shifts in NATO’s priorities for expansion
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are already observable, as the alliance has shifted toward incorporating members from central
Europe rather than expanding eastward. Russia’s efforts in Georgia and Ukraine seem, therefore, to
have fulfilled their primary objective of freezing those countries in place, but they also appear to
have successfully signaled Russia’s broader intent to defend the integrity of its sphere of influence.
Yet, it is feasible that, as leadership rotates and time passes after these major Russian
incursions, NATO might once again consider admitting countries bordering Russia as members.
Absent a major shift in NATO-Russia relations or a Russian economic downturn like that of the
1990s, NATO should expect vehement pushback from the Russians, as demonstrated in the past. Of
course, even given severe Russian rhetoric, it is possible that NATO may still be able to maneuver its
way to successful incorporation of the state in question. However, if Russia maintains an aggressive
posture, to proceed successfully with these accession efforts, NATO may need to pursue more
drastic actions.
Ultimately, NATO’s course of action depends on the issues that it intends to address in the
long term. If NATO aims to prevent further destabilizing Russian military interventions against NA
states, it must acknowledge the roots of such invasions. Assertive NATO behavior geared toward the
accession of further NA states is likely to prompt further Russian responses in the form of military
action. As a result of NATO’s successful enlargement efforts in the late 1990s and early 2000s, the
alliance became complacent and assumed it could promise Ukraine and Georgia the same treatment.
Yet, it must be noted that if Russia were not experiencing a period of crippling weakness at this time,
it likely would have reacted far more aggressively to the membership processes of Estonia and even
the Warsaw Pact countries.
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Russia was only able to assert its stance when it regained the ability to intervene militarily. In
late 2014, eminent offensive neorealist John Mearsheimer published an article entitled “Why the
Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault.” Mearsheimer, predictably, attributes Russia’s annexation of
Crimea, among other factors, to NATO’s bold steps forward in bringing Ukraine closer to the
alliance. He labels this situation a case of “Geopolitics 101,” as “great powers are always sensitive to
potential threats near their home territory,” and ultimately, “it is the Russians, not the West, who …
get to decide what counts as a threat to them.”196 It is only logical that this attitude will continue to
guide Russian strategic thought as its leaders carefully observe NATO’s actions in the region. If
NATO aims to drastically reduce the odds of armed Russian interventions in NA states, it will likely
need to shelve any plans to give membership to any of those countries.
Yet, if NATO primarily seeks to continue incorporating additional NA states into the
alliance, this paper implies that no long-term solution agreeable to Russia exists. If this is NATO’s
goal, it might consider freezing efforts at NA state accession unacceptable and might instead
consider pursuing membership for these countries in a covert manner. This would hinge on the
alliance’s ability to develop both those countries’ military capacities and their military coordination
capabilities with NATO without Russia observing this process, with the assumption that if NATO
suddenly announced the state’s membership, Russia would be unable to intervene militarily in
protest.
Obviously, this snap-intervention approach would prove extremely risky for the entire
alliance and any NA state involved. It is likely impossible in the first place to achieve this without
Russian knowledge. Furthermore, even if this were possible, it would constitute an incredibly risky
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policy. A Russian discovery of any secret efforts to develop an NA state’s military capacity and
military links to NATO would likely result not only in severe direct intervention but also in
considerable long-term damage to the diplomatic relationships between Russia and Western states.
Even if this gambit did succeed and NATO could suddenly announce the membership of one or
multiple states, this policy would cause potentially irreparable damage to the trust between Russia
and NATO. Yet, although this option obviously entails tremendous risks, it undeniably does contain
benefits for the alliance, as NATO would gain more valuable footholds along the Russian border.
Despite this advantage, however, the potential costs of such an approach likely outweighs the
benefits.
Aside from these predictions, a continuation by the U.S. of current President Donald
Trump’s more entrenched and isolationist approach toward international politics could have
significant effects on Russia’s intervention calculus. Trump’s skeptical attitude toward NATO, if
continued, may severely reduce both NATO’s ability to expand eastward and also the credibility of
NATO deterrent threats. If NATO, in the long term, adopts a policy of reduced engagement in
eastern Europe, there are several different reactions that Russia might take. It might see this period
as providing increased leeway to intervene militarily against non-NATO NA states with reduced risk
of international intervention or severe punishment. However, it could also view this situation as an
opportunity for coercing these countries into closer relationships through non-military means. If
U.S. leaders continue to question the importance of NATO, it is also possible that Russia may feel
more comfortable with intervening against NATO states in non-military domains or may even test
NATO’s commitment to responding to lower-intensity kinetic aggression in areas like Estonia’s
Narva.
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Predicting the events of the future based on the trends of the past is never simple, but it is
my hope that this paper’s findings may serve as a historically grounded guide for understanding the
Russian intervention calculus as new crises emerge. In an ideal world, the twenty-first century could
represent a point of yet unprecedented levels of cooperation between Russia and the Western
nations of NATO in the current format of the international system. Yet, barring any enormous
shifts in the balance of great power politics, conflicts and flashpoints are sure to emerge, stemming
from either familiar catalysts or triggers unforeseeable at this point in time. In such an environment,
it is the careful consideration of the underlying factors that influence Russian behavior, and not the
blanket labeling of Russian behavior as benign or revanchist without qualification, that will enable
current and aspiring NATO states to navigate peaceful diplomacy with Russia. Perhaps with this
attitude and theoretical base, the Narva River’s Hermann Castle and Ivangorod Fortress will witness
nothing more than the quiet chatter of tourists and commuters, and not the roar of artillery, at the
Russian border crossing.
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